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The author’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works is one of
the most maligned doctrines in modern U.S. copyright.1  Lying at the
root of this dissatisfaction is the Copyright Act’s expansive conception
of derivative works.  The statute defines this term as “a work based
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”2
Courts apply the final clause of this definition (i.e. the “in any other
form” language) very broadly, thus allowing the author control over an
ever-expanding range of new adaptations.  Controversially, courts
have held the following types of activities to create derivative works:
writing a trivia quiz book based on the TV show Seinfeld;3 manufac-
turing computer chips that speed up a video game’s rate of play;4 cut-
ting out pictures from a book of artwork and mounting them on
1. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of derivative works).
3. Carol Rock v. Carol Publ’g, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
4. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F .2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
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ceramic tiles;5 and producing cassette tapes that, when inserted to the
plaintiff’s toy teddy bears, allowed the bears to speak and move.6
Commentators consistently bemoan this interpretation of the de-
rivative work right as excessively broad.7  They point out that such
strong control over derivative works is unnecessary to provide authors
with incentives to create new works;8 that this control increases the
costs of follow-on creation in the future;9 and that it limits the ability
of others to freely express themselves as protected by the First
Amendment.10  These problems have led scholars to call the deriva-
tive work right “highly problematic,”11 label it the “most troublesome”
area of copyright,12 and question its constitutionality.13  As a result,
5. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
6. Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vertical Learning Sys., 658 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D.
Tex. 1986); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp.
125, 140 (N.D. Ohio. 1986).
7. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, The Widening Gyre: Are Derivative Works Getting Out
of Hand? 3 CAR. ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1984) (demonstrating concern at the increas-
ing scope of the derivative works right); Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Reexamining Copy-
right’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 650–53 (1996) (an
economic case for a reduced derivative work right); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cop-
yright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 376–82 (1996) (limiting
derivative work right on democratic participation grounds); Naomi Abe Voegtli,
Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK L. REV. 1213 (1997); Tyler T. Ochoa,
Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the
Form(Gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 S. SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH L.J. 991, 1020 (2004) (arguing against the use of the derivative
works right to exclude others from making unfixed derivative works unless they
infringe the public performance right).
8. Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Copyright, Derivative Works, and the Economics of Comple-
ments, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779 (2009–2010); Tim Wu, Tolerated Uses, 31
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS. 617, 631 (2008) (arguing that often derivative work rights
allow the author control over complementary goods that do not harm his incen-
tives to create).
9. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Re-
lated Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 329 (2005) (“The incentives justification for
the derivative right thus rests on an enthymematic and uncertain empirical
claim, that the increase in the number and quality of original works that the
derivative right effects more than offsets any decreases in the number of deriva-
tive works.”).
10. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutional-
ity, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 49–54 (2002).
11. Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative
Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505, 1509 (2013).
12. WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:46 (2013) (later stating,
“[R]egrettably the understanding of derivative works is fast approaching incom-
prehensibility.”); Other treaty writers are also confused as to the scope and pur-
pose of the right. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT 8.09[A] (2012) (calling the right “completely superfluous”).
13. See, e.g., Christina Bohannon, Taming the Derivative Work Right: A Modest Pro-
posal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 669 (2010) (arguing that the First Amendment must limit the derivative
works right); Rubenfeld, supra note 10.
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various proposals now exist that demonstrate how the right could be
restrained and transformed to better suit the underlying goals of
copyright.14
However, so far these American scholars have not noticed that dif-
ferent countries approach the derivative work right in different
ways.15  Broadly speaking, states have developed two approaches to
the derivative work right.  Some states follow a standard-based ap-
proach, while others follow a rule-based approach.  The distinction
here is one of precision.  Rules are highly precise legal commands (e.g.
you must drive below 70 mph), while standards are imprecise com-
mands (e.g. you must not drive “dangerously”).  Rules are fixed and
clear; standards are flexible and allow the court discretion in deter-
mining the law’s content.16  Under the standard-based approach to
the derivative work right, the state provides the author a right over
derivative works and then defines the term “derivative work” in a
broad, vague, and open-ended fashion.  The U.S. law demonstrates the
standard-based approach par excellence.  Including the “any other
form” language in the Act made the author’s right broad and vague
while ultimately giving the court discretion to decide the law’s scope.17
14. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 11 (suggesting that the correct interpretation of
the derivative work right requires courts only to find infringement when a new
derivative work is sufficiently analogous to one of the nine enumerated exam-
ples); Voegtli, supra note 7 (suggesting a statutory amendment to reduce the cur-
rent scope of the right as applied to issues such as appropriation art); Mark
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 1074–83 (1997) (suggesting a concept of blocking copyright and ex-
panding fair use).
15. However, some scholars have employed comparative methodology to the issue of
adaptation rights. See Paul Goldstein, Adaptation Rights and Moral Rights in
the United Kingdom, United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany, 14
INT’L REV. IND. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 43 (1983) (comparing the U.S., U.K., and Ger-
many); Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects
Foxes Better Than Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 755 (2013) (comparing
U.S., U.K., French, German, and Berne Convention history).
16. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974).
17. The distinction between rules and standards is not a dichotomy.  They are terms
for two states that lie on either end of a spectrum of precision.  As a result, most
laws actually fall somewhere between the two.  The U.S. approach is standard-
based because its imprecision makes it more akin to a standard than a rule.
However, it is true that courts do not have unlimited discretion when determin-
ing the content of the derivative work right. See Samuelson, supra note 11 (dis-
cussing how Congress has limited the breadth of the derivative work right via the
use of the nine preceding examples).  Similarly, the U.K. approach is more rule-
based because it is more precise and less vague, but that does not mean there is
no discretion for courts.  What counts as a “translation,” for example, is a matter
that courts have some discretion on.
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Accompanying the U.S. in this group are states such as Germany18
and China.19
In contrast, the legislature that follows a rule-based approach de-
fines precisely what types of derivative works fall under the author’s
right.  Adopting this approach, the U.K. provides authors with a right
to make adaptations20 and defines the term “adaptation” narrowly in
relation to the type of subject matter in question.21  If a British author
creates a literary work, he will receive the right to make adaptations,
but adaptation in this context is limited to (a) translations, (b) drama-
tizations, and (c) conveying the story wholly or mainly by means of
pictures.22  Or if the author makes a musical work, the law will grant
him exclusivity over (a) arrangements of the work and (b) transcrip-
tions.23  In no case is the author provided with a broad, open-ended
right to control all adaptations.24  Accordingly, courts are allowed
much less discretion in determining what types of adaptations are ca-
pable of infringing copyright.  Other countries following this approach
include Australia25 and Singapore.26
18. Law on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, § 23 (as amended July 16, 1998)
(“Adaptations or other transformations of a work may be published or exploited
only with the consent of the author . . . .”) (Ger.).
19. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, § 10(14) (1990) (the author has
“the right of adaptation, that is the right to change a work into a new one with
originality”) (China).
20. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 16 [hereinafter CDPA] (U.K.).
21. Id. § 21(3).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 152–53 (Oxford
University Press, 3d ed. 2009) (the U.K. adaptation right is “restrictively defined
and is not to be confused with a general right to control all derivative works, such
as that recognized by copyright law in the U.S.A.”); HECTOR MACQUEEN, CHAR-
LOTTE WAELDE, GRAEME LAURIE & ABBE BROWN, CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 138 (Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2008) (Adaptation in the U.K. “is
given a restricted meaning.”).
25. Copyright Act, § 10 (1968)
adaptation means:
(a) in relation to a literary work in a non-dramatic version form a
version of the work (whether in its original language or in a dif-
ferent language) in a dramatic form;
(b) in relation to a literary work in a dramatic form a version of the
work (whether in its original language or in a different lan-
guage) in a non-dramatic form;
(ba) in relation to a literary work being a computer program – a ver-
sion of the work (whether or not in the language, code or nota-
tion in which the work was originally expressed) not being a
reproduction of the work;
(c) in relation to a literary work (whether in a non-dramatic form in
a dramatic form):
i. a translation of the work; or
ii. a version of the work in which a story or action is conveyed
solely or principally by means of pictures; and
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Currently, the U.S. is considering major copyright reform.  The
Register of Copyrights, Maria Pallante, has called for the “next great
copyright act”27 while others are working tirelessly to craft principles
ensuring balance in the future legislation.28  Given the controversy
caused by the derivative works right, it is time to consider how other
nations deal with this issue.  This Article suggests that when re-
forming the derivative works right, the U.S. should adopt a rule-based
approach, like the U.K.
In 1976, the U.S. adopted a standard-based derivative work right,
hoping this would enable the law to flexibly extend over new, unfore-
seeable derivative works that may arise in the future.  In contrast, the
U.K. worried that a general adaptation right may lead to excessively
broad law.  Therefore, the U.K. narrowly tailored their adaptation
right and tried to find flexibility to deal with novel adaptations else-
where in the copyright system.  Using economic literature on the com-
parative efficiency of rules and standards, this Article demonstrates
how the U.K.’s approach was ultimately more efficient.  Since enacting
the Copyright Act 1976, U.S. law has become excessively broad.  The
lack of limits on the derivative work concept allowed authors to ex-
clude many new welfare-enhancing works from the market.  At the
same time, the vagueness inherent in the standard-based approach
makes application of the law much more complicated, time consuming,
and costly.  The U.K. avoided these problems by adopting a precise,
(d) in relation to a musical work – an arrangement or transcription
of the work
(Austl.).
26. Copyright Act, § 7 (Chapter 63) (Revised Edition 1988)
“adaptation”—
a) in relation to a literary work in a non-dramatic form, means a
version of the work (whether in its original language or in a dif-
ferent language) in a dramatic form;
b) in relation to a literary work in a dramatic form, means a version
of the work (whether in its original language or in a different
language) in a non-dramatic form;
c) in relation to a literary work being a computer program, means a
version of the work (whether or not in the language, code or nota-
tion in which the work was originally expressed) not being a re-
production of the work;
d) in relation to a literary work (whether in a non-dramatic form or
dramatic form) means –
i) a translation of the work; or
ii) a version of the work in which a story or action is conveyed
solely or principally by means of pictures; and
e) in relation to a musical work, means an arrangement or tran-
scription of the work
(emphasis added) (Sing.).
27. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 315
(2013).
28. Pam Samuelson & Members of the Copyright Principles Project, The Copyright
Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175 (2010).
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rule-based approach to derivative works.  As a result, the perturba-
tions surrounding the U.S. derivative works right do not exist in the
U.K.
Part I of this Article explains why the U.K. and U.S. adopted differ-
ent approaches to the derivative works right.  Part II shows how this
decision to adopt different approaches eventually led to different case
outcomes.  Part III compares the two approaches using economic liter-
ature on legal rules and standards.  Doing so demonstrates how the
U.S. standard-based approach is substantively too broad and proce-
durally too costly.  Part IV considers some potential solutions to rem-
edy the inefficiencies in U.S. law.  This Article contends that the U.S.
should make a statutory amendment to the Copyright Act and adopt
a rule-based approach, much like that found in the U.K.  Part V
concludes.
I. HISTORY OF THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN COPYRIGHT
Why exactly did the U.S. and U.K. adopt different approaches to
the derivative work right?  It initially appears strange that the two
systems, linked by shared history and copyright philosophy, would ap-
proach this important issue in such different ways.  In order to answer
that question, the first section shall recap the history of the derivative
work concept during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  This
demonstrates the similar path that the U.S. and U.K. doctrine fol-
lowed prior to the twentieth century.  After this point the laws began
to diverge.  Accordingly, the second section focuses on the U.S. during
the twentieth century and why it chose a standard-based approach.
The third section focuses on the U.K.’s twentieth century decision to
adopt a rule-based approach.  This demonstrates an overarching nar-
rative plaguing both states during the previous century: how could so-
ciety create copyright law that is flexible enough to deal with new and
unforeseen technologies while still retaining legal clarity?  The differ-
ent approaches to the derivative works right chosen by the U.S. and
U.K. were the result of different answers to that question.  The U.S.
chose a standard-based approach because it enabled flexibility within
the law.  By contrast, the U.K. chose a rule-based approach to keep the
law well-defined while seeking flexibility elsewhere in the copyright
system.
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A. Anglo-American Copyright During the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries
Early copyright laws did not provide authors with any rights to
control derivative works.29  The first copyright statute, the Statute of
Anne, enacted in Great Britain in 1710, provided authors of books the
exclusive right to print, reprint, and vend their books for an initial
period of fourteen years.30  Unlike today’s law, the Act was silent
about derivative works.  Courts interpreted this silence as meaning
authors had no exclusivity over adaptations of their works.  In 1721,
Lord Macclesfield ruled in Burnet v. Chetwood that unauthorized
translations were not illegal.31  It was his view that translation
“might not be the same with reprinting the original.”32  This was fol-
lowed by Gyles v. Wilcox in 1740, where Lord Hardwicke ruled “fair
abridgements” did not infringe the statute.33  It was only an infringe-
ment of the statute to “colorably shorten” the work, i.e., to make minor
alterations (e.g. removing a few pages) to deliberately evade the stat-
ute’s reach.34
As Professor Kaplan once summarized, courts at this time deter-
mined infringement not by looking at what the defendant had taken,
but at what he had added or contributed.35  It did not matter greatly if
the adapter copied large amounts of text, so long as he also added
something new to the work.  Translations added new expression and
abridgments added new editing. Meanwhile, these adaptations intro-
duced the old work to new markets and, therefore, helped disseminate
knowledge further and wider than previously possible,36 an outcome
which chimed well with the overarching ideals of the Enlightenment.
29. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 49–51
(Harvard Univ. Press, 1993); Ronan Deazley, The Statute of Anne and the Great
Abridgement Swindle, 47 HOUS. L. REV.  793 (2010).
30. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c.19 (1710) (Eng.).
31. (1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.) 1009 (an English version of a Latin work was not
infringing).
32. Id.
33. (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.); see also Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) Amb. 403
(holding there is no infringement so long as the adaptation is a fair abridgment);
Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East 361 (stating there must be a balance between in-
fringement and the advancement of art); Cary v. Kearsley, (1802) 4 Esp. 168, 170
(“[A] man may fairly adopt part of the work of another: he may so make use of
another’s labours for the promotion of science, and the benefit of the public.”).
34. See, e.g., Tonson v. Walker, (1752) 3 Swans 672 (holding that removing a handful
of pages was colorable shortening).
35. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT, REPUBLISHED (AND WITH
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS) 17 (Matthew Bender ed., 2005) (during this time,
the courts answered the question of infringement “by looking not so much to what
the defendant had taken as to what he had added or contributed . . . .”).
36. See, e.g., Strahan v. Newbery, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (praising abridgments for
their ability to make original works “less expensive, and more convenient both to
the time and use of the reader”).
2014] WHY THE U.K. ADAPTATION RIGHT IS SUPERIOR 851
Simultaneously, the early copyright law still was linked to the previ-
ous seventeenth century regulation of the printing press.  The right
holder’s control was not so much over the intangible work but over the
physical book.37  Translations and abridgements may have similarity
to the author’s literary creation, but they were the consequence of new
skill, judgment, and labor, and, as a result, were tangibly different
books to any prior work.  Such new works could simply not be viewed
as copies.
This laissez-faire attitude later formed the foundation for the U.S.
law.  In 1790 the first U.S. Copyright Act was enacted.  Like its prede-
cessor, the Statute of Anne, the legislation was silent on the issue of
adaptations.  Courts once again quickly filled in the blanks.  In 1853,
Justice Grier reasoned that translations were not infringing.38  Echo-
ing Macclesfield’s earlier pragmatic reasoning, Grier simply felt that
translating a work was not the same as copying a work.  Concurrently,
the fair abridgment principle was acknowledged in a string of cases,39
a fact that contemporary copyright treatise writer Eaton Drone called
“not surprising” given the prominent position of the fair abridgement
doctrine in British law.40
However, a shift was to occur in both countries starting during the
middle of the nineteenth century.  The Romantic era would introduce
a new paradigm through which art and creation were viewed.
Whereas the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were dominated by
Enlightenment ideals and print culture, Romanticism brought a fresh
emphasis on the genius involved in creation.  Previously the author
was seen as a mere vessel, through which God created art and litera-
37. The first steps that British society took toward recognizing a property right in the
intangible text, as opposed to the physical book, came in Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26
Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch.), where the court noted a distinction between a property right
arising from possession of the physical paper and a property right to reproduce
the text. See Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Pope v. Curl, PRIMARY SOURCES ON
COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, eds., 2008), http://
copy.law.cam.ac.uk/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1741a.
38. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (finding
that translations are not, for purposes of the copyright law, “copies”).
39. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 59–63 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136); Webb v.
Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511, 518–20 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323); Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 347–49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Gray v. Russell, 10
F. Cas. 1035, 1038–39 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728); see also 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 214 (1836) (repeating the rule that bona fide abridgement was not an
infringement).
40. EATON DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUC-
TIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES: EMBRACING COPYRIGHT IN
WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART, AND PLAYWRIGHT IN DRAMATIC AND MUSICAL
COMPOSITIONS 437 (photo. reprint 1972) (1879).
852 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:843
ture.41  Romanticism began to view the author himself as the crea-
tor.42  The author viewed the world, internalized it, added something
of himself to it, and returned this new work to society.  He generated
some new element, and this spark of creative genius was embodied
into the physical product.43  In the Romantic view, this core kernel of
creativity existed prior to its eventual fixation in its physical form.
Authors argued that this metaphysical essence underlying the work
ought to be the focus of copyright.  Naturally, the author ought to con-
trol this in any form that it took.44
Commentators on both sides of the Atlantic, less restrained by pre-
cedent than the judiciary, began to critique the previous reasoning of
the law on adaptations.  For example, George Ticknor Curtis argued
that translation was a mere repackaging of the ideas and sentiments
in the original that were truly the focus of copyright.  The new lan-
guage used was simply “a different medium of communicating that in
which [the author] has an exclusive property.”45  Eaton Drone also
41. See, e.g., Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Le-
gal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author,’ 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD.
425, 426–27 (1984) (describing the Renaissance view of the author as an inspired
craftsman).
42. Id. at 427 (“[I]nspiration came to be regarded as emanating not from outside or
above, but from within the writer himself. ‘Inspiration’ came to be explicated in
terms of original genius, with the consequence that the inspired work was made
peculiarly and distinctively the product—and the property—of the writer.”).
43. The Supreme Court used this reasoning in Burrow-Giles Lithograpic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884), in order to justify the protection of copyright in
photographs.  The Court reasoned that the production emanated “entirely from
[the photographer’s] own mental conception” and, as a result, should be protected
despite the fact that the mental conception found a physical form in a photo-
graph. Id.
44. The Court accepted this argument in Holmes v. Hurts, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).  “It is
the intellectual production of the author which the copyright protects, and not the
particular form which such production ultimately takes; and the word ‘book,’ as
used in the statute, is not to be understood in its technical sense of a bound vol-
ume, but any species of publication which the author selects to embody his liter-
ary product.” Id. at 89. See also Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship
Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright,
118 YALE L.J. 186, 226 (2008) (noting that during the nineteenth century “[a]n
elaborate representation of the author’s intellectual creation as an intellectual
essence that could take a manifold of concrete forms gradually developed” and
that copyright came to be thought of as “a general control of this elusive intellec-
tual essence, irrespective of form”); Jane Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial
Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865,
1887 (1990) (describing this process as the “deincorporealizing” of copyright).
45. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 293 (Boston:
Charles C. Little & James Brown 1847).  Curtis argued that copyright included
all of the “sentiment and ideas” that the author created. Id. at 273.  As a result,
the author was entitled to “all the profits of publication which the book can, in
any form, produce.” Id. at 237–38.  This modern approach viewed copyright as so
broad that the Supreme Court would later be required to form some restraints on
the author’s exclusive rights.  Restraint was accomplished in part by the Court’s
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found the Stowe v. Thomas decision, which denied authors an exclu-
sive right to translate, to be “contrary to justice and recognized princi-
ples.”46  Commentators were equally uneasy about the fair
abridgement rule.  Curtis said that copyright extended to the “whole
book and every part of it” and, therefore, gave the author a right to
exclude others from making abridgements.47  Walter Arthur Copinger
called the rule permitting fair abridgments “very unreasonable”48 and
suggested consigning it to the history books.49
The black letter law soon began to change.  In the U.S., Folsom v.
Marsh50 proved to be a breakthrough case.  Jared Sparks published
The Writings of George Washington, an edited version of the former
president’s letters and papers, in twelve volumes between 1834 and
1837.  Later in 1840, Charles Upham published The Life of Washing-
ton.  Though Sparks’s publishers claimed this book was an infringe-
ment, Upham’s work was arguably lawful as a fair abridgment.
Sparks’s work was 6763 pages long; by contrast, Upham’s work was
866 pages long, and only 353 pages were directly copied from Sparks’s
work.51  In addition, the only copied materials were the direct words of
Washington; Upham copied none of Sparks’s original expression.  The
character of the books was also different: Sparks’s work was a collec-
tion of writings from George Washington, while Upham’s work was
more of a biography.
Nevertheless, Justice Story saw the issue differently.  While ac-
knowledging the fair abridgement principle in theory,52 he went on to
radically redefine its content.  In his view, it was not a fair abridge-
ment to produce a work that caused the previous author market harm.
Unlike judges of previous centuries, he would not excuse a work
merely if it added some new expression.  Instead it was an infringe-
ment to make a work that “may prejudice the sale, or diminish the
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”53  Story found
ruling that ideas are not copyrightable subject matter. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden,
104 U.S. 99, 101 (1879).
46. DRONE, supra note 40, at 454.
47. CURTIS, supra note 45, at 273.
48. WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 35–36, 101–02 (London: Ste-
vens & Haynes 1870).
49. Id. at 101–02.
50. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
51. Oren Bracha, Commentary on Folsom v. Marsh (1841), PRIMARY SOURCES ON COP-
YRIGHT (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M.Kretschmer eds., 2008), http://copy.law.cam.
ac.uk/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_us_1841. See also L. Ray
Pattinson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 433 (1998)
(discussing the facts in the case).
52. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344–45.
53. Id. at 348.
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that Upham’s work did harm the market for Sparks’s work and was,
therefore, an infringement.54
Justice Story’s opinion altered how the law reacted to derivative
works.  No longer was the adapter judged by what he had contributed;
now the touchstone of infringement was substitutability in the market
place.  The author was allowed to control the work if his intangible
creation was used in a way detrimental to his profits.  Derivative
works that built on the author’s work were now viewed suspiciously.
It would not be long until Congress would intervene legislatively to
allow authors the ability to reserve a right to translate and dramatize
their works.55
The U.K. followed the same path during this period.  The court in
D’Almaine v. Boosey adopted a market harm inquiry to judge whether
derivative works infringed.56  The question was whether the rear-
rangement of a musical air could be considered an infringement.
Holding that it was, Lord Abinger said, “[T]he mere adaptation of the
air . . . does not, even to common apprehensions, alter the original
subject. The ear tells you that it is the same.”57  The infringement, in
his view, constituted taking from the work that which made it “most
saleable.”58  As in the U.S., this new approach considered whether a
54. Id. at 349.  A similar train of thought can be found in Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas.
1132, 1138 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552).  This case concerned the right of pub-
lic performance.  The copyright holder’s dramatic work, Under the Gaslight, con-
tained a scene in which a character was bound to a railroad track and in danger
of being killed by an oncoming train.  Another character then saved the first char-
acter by untying him.  The defendant’s work was very dissimilar to this play,
except for this railroad scene.  Even then, the railroad scene was somewhat dif-
ferent in each work.  Nevertheless, Judge Blatchford held that the similarity in
action, narrative, and effect rendered the use an infringement:
A mere mechanic in dramatic composition can make such adaptation,
and it is a piracy, if the appropriated series of events, when presented on
the stage, although performed by new and different characters, using
different language, is recognized by the spectator, through any of the
senses to which the representation is addressed, as conveying substan-
tially the same impressions to, and exciting the same emotions in, the
mind, in the same sequence or order.
Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1138.  Paul Goldstein calls this the first “great intellectual leap”
in the development of U.S. derivative work rights.  Paul Goldstein, Derivative
Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 213
(1983).
55. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1916).
56. D’Almaine v. Boosey, (1835) 160 Eng. Rep. 117 (K.B.) 123 (noting that where a
work takes “such [material] as made [the original] most saleable, the maker of
the abridgement commits a piracy.”) (U.K.).
57. Id. at 123.
58. Id.
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consumer would substitute the two works.59  If so, then the second
comer’s use of the original author’s work was an infringement.
The fair abridgement rule thus evolved to include market substitu-
tion.  In a celebrated case involving the work of Charles Dickens, one
judge denied the existence of a right to abridge.60  Later in 1863, an-
other court attacked the Enlightenment approach to adaptations, say-
ing, “The Court has gone far enough in [endorsing abridgements]; and
it is difficult to acquiesce in the reason sometimes given, that the com-
piler of an abridgement is a benefactor to mankind, by assisting in the
diffusion of knowledge.”61  Although no case concerning translations
came before U.K. courts during this time, commentators also began to
find fault with the Burnet v. Chetwood precedent that translations
were not infringements.62  Thus, the common law in the U.K. and the
U.S. aligned prior to starting the twentieth century.63  Both countries
59. ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 184 (Hart Publishing 2010) (The new approach in the United Kingdom
“emphasised the marketplace effects of copying and prioritised the impact on the
plaintiff’s work.”).  Other courts quickly adopted this test.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Ful-
larton, (1839) 48 Eng. Rep. 1080 (Ch.) (finding that where the amount taken was
inconsiderable, and the likelihood of injury to plaintiff small, the court may de-
cline to interfere at all or refuse to enjoin the second work and leave the plaintiff
to his remedy at law); T.W. Gunning, Sweet & Others v. Shaw, 3 JURIST 217, 219
(1839) (verbatim copying of eleven legal cases and abridgment of thirty-nine
others from a law textbook would “materially operate to prevent the sale by the
plaintiffs of their work”).
60. W.W. Cooper, Dickens v. Lee, 8 JURIST 183, 184 (1844).  The discussion quotes
Vice Chancellor Knight Bruce as follows:
I am not aware that one man has the right to abridge the works of an-
other.  On the other hand, I do not mean to say that there may not be an
abridgment which may be lawful, which may be protected; but, to say
that one man has the right to abridge, and so to publish in an abridged
form the work of another, without more, is going much beyond my notion
of what the law of this country is.
Id.
61. Tinsley v. Lacy, (1862) 71 Eng. Rep. 327, 330 (K.B.).  The trend of restricting the
fair abridgement rule continued through numerous cases. See, e.g., Wood v. Boo-
sey, (1867) 2 L.R.Q.B. 340, 350 (Eng.) (noting the possibility that a arrangement
of an opera for pianoforte done without the opera composer’s permission could
infringe copyright); Walter v. Steinkopff, (1892) 3 Ch. 489, 495 (Eng.) (finding
infringement where defendants “desire to reap where they have not sown, and to
take advantage of the labour and expenditure” of the original author); Kelly v.
Morris, (1866) 1 L.R. Eq. 697, 701–03 (Eng.) (granting an injunction where the
defendant’s directory copied factual material from the plaintiff’s, on the theory
that “a subsequent compiler is bound to set about doing for himself that which
the first compiler has done”).
62. See, e.g., THOMAS EDWARD SCRUTTON, THE LAWS OF COPYRIGHT 49 (London: John
Murray, 1883) (describing the rule that translations were not infringements as
“opposed to all correct principles”).
63. However, it is worth noting that the market effects test did not lead to complete
acceptance of authors’ rights in adaptation.  In the U.K. at least, dramatizations
were often made freely.  While occasionally authors could prevent unlicensed dra-
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were gradually warming up to an authorial right to make derivative
works.
B. Derivative Works in Twentieth Century U.S. Copyright
During the twentieth century, the U.S. went on to adopt a stan-
dard-based right to prepare derivative works.  As will be seen here,
this stemmed from a desire to create flexible law, capable of dealing
with unforeseen technology.
1. The 1909 Copyright Act
At the start of the twentieth century, those involved in copyright
discussions became increasingly aware of the flaws inherent in the
copyright law’s hitherto ad hoc nature.  Piecemeal development had
occurred through court cases and additional statutes, but the time had
come to consolidate these developments into one new Act.  Register of
Copyrights Thorvald Solberg produced a number of annual reports
that recommended the simplification and consolidation of a law in-
creasing in scope.64  He advised that Congress appoint a commission
comprised of individuals whose interests were affected by the law, to
plan future revisions.65  The Senate Committee on Patents agreed to
hold a conference where experts and interested parties could consider
potentially codification of copyright law.66  In response, Herbert Put-
nam, the Librarian of Congress, convened a series of conferences in
New York City and Washington D.C. between 1905 and 1906.67  How-
ever, Putnam invited mainly representatives of industries that al-
ready had rights under the existing copyright law; no one specifically
represented the public interest.68  These industry-led debates led to a
matizations, others could not obtain injunctions. Compare, e.g., Reade v. Lacy,
(1861) 70 Eng. Rep. 853 (K.B.) (enjoining an unlicensed dramatization of a novel,
which was based on the original author’s earlier play), with Toole v. Young,
(1874) 9 L.R.Q.B. 523 (Eng.) (declaring nonsuit where plaintiff, the assignee of
dramatization rights in a novel, who never in fact wrote a play, brought action
against defendant based on defendant’s dramatization of the same novel).
64. LIBRARY OF CONG., S. DOC. NO. 58-10, pt. 1, at 68–69 (1903); S. DOC. NO. 57-6, pt.
1, at 63–65 (1902); S. DOC. NO. 57-35, pt. 1, at 60–61 (1901).
65. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONG., S. DOC. NO. 58-10, pt. 1, at 68 (1903) (renewing re-
quest, as in past two reports, for a copyright commission). See generally 1 WIL-
LIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 56–58 (1st ed. 1994), available at
http://digital-law-online.info/patry/patry6.html (summarizing the legislative his-
tory of the 1909 Copyright Act).
66. Letter from Sen. Kittredge of South Dakota to Librarian of Congress Herbert
Putnam, in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, pt. M, at M5 (E.
Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976).
67. PATRY, supra note 65, at 57.
68. See Stenographic Report of the Proceedings of the First Session of the Conference
on Copyright, in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note
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draft bill that later formed the foundation for the 1909 Copyright
Act.69
The result of this industry-focused approach to copyright legisla-
tion was highly reactionary and inflexible law, as Professor Litman
has already highlighted.70  The representatives sought to maintain
their advantages under the old law, while seeking a better deal for
their particular industry on issues where there remained a disadvan-
tage.71  Where the parties’ interests diverged, they compromised.
Agreement was reached on controversial issues by treating the partic-
ular classes of work separately from one another.72  As a result, the
Act defined specific types of copyrightable works and the rights pro-
tected for each type.  The goal was not to provide broad copyright prin-
ciples that would tie that law coherently together, but to provide each
industry with the bundle of rights that they required.73  The author’s
right of public performance demonstrates the convoluted result.
Some, like authors of novels, did not receive this right at all,74 while
dramatists received the right in all situations.75  Others such, as lec-
turers, were only given the exclusive right to perform the work for
profit,76 and musical works were only granted the exclusive right to
perform the work publicly for profit except on coin-operated
machines.77
Nowhere could this approach to legislation drafting be seen better
than in the statute’s provision for derivative works.  Under the Act,
authors were given the right to:
[t]ranslate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any
other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondra-
matic work; to convert it into a novel or other non dramatic work if it be a
drama; to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and
finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art . . . .78
66, pt. C, at iii–vi (listing national associations of authors publishers, and artists
as invitees to the first conference).
69. H.R. 25133, 59th Cong. (1907), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909
COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 66, pt. N, at N19–N53; S. 8190, 59th Cong. (1907)
reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 66,
pt. Q, at 39–74.
70. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
REV. 275, 288–304 (1989) (discussing the tension surrounding the drafting and
passage of the 1909 Act).
71. Id. at 280.
72. Id.
73. See Abe Goldberg, Copyright Law Revision Part 2—A Review of the Record, BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y, Apr. 1963, at 214, 216–17 (1962).
74. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(d), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (granting
exclusive rights of public performance only where the original work was a drama)
(repealed by Copyright Act of 1976).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 1(c).
77. Id. § 1(e).
78. Id. § 1(b).
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In effect, the conference holders asked the representatives what types
of adaptations had caused them grievances in the past and accord-
ingly added their answers to the industry’s list of entitlements.79  For
example, the American Dramatists Club wanted playwrights to have
the exclusive right to dramatize their works;80 the right accordingly
found its way into the derivative works provision.  The Music Publish-
ers’ Association wanted musical arrangements to be protected, and
thus, arrangements were also added to the derivative work provi-
sion.81  Any attempt to create broad principles governing adaptations
gave way to specific, fine-grained, and enumerated rights depending
on the subject matter in question.82  The overall result of this ap-
proach was that, at the outset of the twentieth century, the U.S.
adopted a precise, rule-based provision on derivative works.
2. From 1909 to 1976
Once enacted, the 1909 Act regulated copyright for more than
sixty-five years.  However, this period was a turbulent one for the cop-
yright law; it was a time of great technological change and develop-
ment.  The twentieth century saw the development of a booming
79. See Litman, supra note 70, at 301 (noting that the conferences began with “each
organization’s articulation of its wish list”).
80. Bronson Howard, President, Am. Dramatists Club, Remarks at the Proceedings
of the Librarian’s Conference on Copyright, 1st Session (June 1, 1905) in 1 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 66, pt. C, at 105–06
(“[T]he principle we have always had in our law that the . . . author of a novel
should have full and absolute control of any dramatized version of it, is very
important . . . .”).
81. George W. Furniss, Chairman, Music Publishers’ Ass’n of the United States, Re-
marks at the Proceedings of the Librarian’s Conference on Copyright, 1st Session
(June 1, 1905) in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note
66, pt. C, at 103–05.
82. Some at the conferences, however, did want general copyright principles.  Rich-
ard Bowker, author of one of the most influential twentieth-century copyright
treatises, stated his desire for a “general provision that should cover the whole
question of subsidiary copyright” and which would be “very general and sweep-
ing.”  Richard R. Bowker, Vice-President, Am. (Authors’) Copyright League, Re-
marks at the Proceedings of the Librarian’s Conference on Copyright, 2nd
Session (Nov. 3, 1905), in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT,
supra note 66, pt. D, at 192.  Solberg was of the same mind. See, e.g., Thorvald
Solberg, Register of Copyrights, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Librarian’s
Conference on Copyright, 1st Session (June 1, 1905) in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 66, pt. C, at 105 (“[M]y desire is, that there
should be an expression of opinion from Conference on the principle of whether
the original primary right is to include all the subsidiary right.”).  This view met
with resistance from Putnam, who did not see the Act as “an attempt at abstract
and theoretic perfection” but as “a bill for this country at this time under [pre-
sent] conditions.” Arguments on the Bills S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, to Amend and
Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright Before Committees on Patents, 58th
Cong. 16 (1904) (statement of Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Cong.), reprinted in 4
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 66, pt. H, at 16.
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motion picture industry; the creation of radio broadcasting; the rise of
the jukebox; the birth of broadcast television and later cable televi-
sion; the invention of computer software; and other technological de-
velopments that affected the exploitation of copyrighted works.  The
drafters of the 1909 Copyright Act had not foreseen these develop-
ments, let alone their implications for copyright owners.  Further-
more, the industry-focused, backward-looking law provided no
fundamental or generally applicable copyright principles to guide
courts on how to deal with new technologies.  The law did not easily
apply to these novel situations, and commentators soon opined the
“antiquity of the statute.”83
This left the judiciary with a difficult role to fulfill. Copyright his-
torically was viewed as a creation of statute; both the House of Lords
and United States Supreme Court had famously decided that statu-
tory copyright superseded any common law copyright.84  On issues of
novel technologies, the wording and intent of the statutes should, the-
oretically, be determinative.85 This caused a bifurcation within the ju-
diciary.  Some continued to view copyright as a purely statutory
framework and argued the 1909 Act was not designed to regulate
these new technologies.  On the other hand, some judges saw the
threat that new technology posed to authors’ legitimate interests.  In-
terpreting the Copyright Act too narrowly would lead to under-inclu-
sive law, under which authors could not exclude harmful new works
from the market.  These judges latched onto the emerging idea of the
author’s right to control his intellectual essence, regardless of form,
and stretched old statutory language to cover new uses.  However, to
accomplish this, new technologies had to be  “jammed into inappropri-
ate statutory language.”86
A few examples demonstrate the courts’ struggle during this era.
Here we shall focus on the issues of motion pictures, radio broadcast-
ing, and cable television.  Though the last two examples involve the
right of public performance rather than derivative work rights,
problems arising in connection with radio and television influenced
authors’ exclusive rights under the 1976 Copyright Act, including the
derivative works rights.
83. Zecharia Chafee Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 515 (1945).
84. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1
Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).
85. Focus on literal wording and meaning was typical statutory interpretation in
U.S. courts during this era.  While formalists still favored the plain meaning of
the statute, progressives tried to unearth legislative intent. See William N. Es-
kridge Jr., The Case of Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Inter-
pretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1732–34 (1993).
86. Chafee, supra note 83, at 516.
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a. Motion Pictures
The technology for motion pictures was developed at the tail end of
the nineteenth century.  By 1910 there were an estimated 8000 to
10,000 movie theatres in the country.87  Yet neither the 1909 Act nor
its predecessor, the 1891 International Copyright Act,88 considered
whether making a motion picture version of a copyrighted work
counted as an infringement.89  This issue arose in Kalem Co. v.
Harper Brothers.90  Although the case was litigated under the 1891
Act, this important case revealed the oversights of the 1909
legislation.
In 1907 the Kalem Company made a silent film based on Lew Wal-
lace’s novel Ben Hur: A Tale of the Christ. One could forgive Kalem for
optimistically believing this not to infringe copyright.  Previously the
Supreme Court announced that if a new technology was not expressly
covered by the Copyright Act, then Congress had not intended for it to
be regulated by copyright.91  One prior case employed similar reason-
87. Q. DAVID BOWERS, NICKELODEON THEATRES AND THEIR MUSIC viii (The Vestal
Press, 1986).
88. See International Copyright Act, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891) (repealed 1909).
89. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–77 (re-
pealed 1976).  No member of the motion picture industry was invited to the con-
ferences to discuss copyright revision. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909
COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 66, pt. C, at iii–vi (invitees to the first session); 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 66, pt. D, at V–VII
(invitees to the second session); 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT
ACT, supra note 66, pt. E, at V–X (invitees to the third session).  However, two
members of the proceedings made statements regarding moving pictures. See
Hearings Before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House of Represent-
atives on Pending Bills to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
60th Cong. (1908) (statement of Frank L. Dyer, Edison Manufacturing Company),
reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 66,
pt. K, at 281–82 (urging that, given public interest in moving pictures, “[t]here
should certainly be no hasty and ill-advised legislation”); id. (statement of Paul
H. Cromelin, President, American Musical Copyright League), reprinted in 5
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 66, pt. K, at
309–11 (noting that he had been asked by president of a moving-picture company
to represent him at the hearing and discussing the difficulties presented by deriv-
ative rights and motion pictures).
90. Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
91. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).  This case, involv-
ing a dispute over music rolls for automatic pianos, illustrates the conflict be-
tween rigid legislation and technological change. The success of this machine led
the manufacturers of Pianolas to create music rolls capable of replicating the
sound of well-known musical compositions. Id. at 9–10 (describing the mechanics
of the machines in general terms).  The copyright holders of those compositions
perceived this new entertainment as a threat and brought action against the
manufacturers.  At issue was whether the creation of the music roll was
equivalent to making a copy of the work and was, therefore, a copyright infringe-
ment. Id. at 11.  The existing copyright law did not contain a provision relating
to music rolls, and there was no evidence the law was intended to cover them.
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ing to find an absence of infringement when a defendant transformed
Ben Hur into a series of magic lantern slides.92
However, Kalem’s optimism was misplaced.  The statute did still
provide authors of novels the ability to dramatize their works.93  Pre-
viously some believed that Congress intended this to cover only stage
productions of authors’ works.  One commentator described the scope
of dramatization prior to 1981 as having “the meaning strictly of us-
ing, or preparing for use, a story or a novel in a drama to be lived by
living persons on a scenic stage.”94  Yet, the Court found this provision
covered motion pictures.  For Justice Holmes, concurring specially, it
did not matter through which medium the audience perceived the
story, only that it did perceive the story.95  This view is not surprising;
in other cases, Justice Holmes had elsewhere declared his view that
copyright ought to protect the essence of the work, regardless of
form.96  Eventually Kalem settled the case for $25,000.97
See id. at 14–16 (discussing legislative history).  The plaintiffs latched onto the
nineteenth-century notion that whatever the copyright statutes said, the real fo-
cus of protection was the intellectual essence created by the author. See id. at 11
(arguing that copyright covered the “intellectual conception which has resulted in
the compilation of notes” and covered “all means of expression of the order of
notes”).  This claim pushed the envelope for the derivative works concept and
advocated for the modern, more general, understanding of copyright.  The defend-
ants relied on the traditional view of copyright, repeating that the “extent of this
protection is a matter of statutory law,” id. at 11, and that the production of the
perforated piano rolls did not fall within that definition.  This argument was
enough to persuade a majority of the Court’s justices. Id. at 17 (“In no sense can
musical sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies,
as that term is generally understood, and as we believe it was intended to be
understood in the statutes under consideration.”).
With this opinion, the Supreme Court took the view that copyright was a stat-
utory right, created by Congress, limited to using the work in certain clearly de-
marcated ways.  Only Congress had the power to add new categories of prohibited
acts.  This stance was consistent with the great literary property cases Donaldson
v. Beckett and Wheaton v. Peters, which referred to copyright as purely statutory.
See supra discussion in subsection I.B.2.  Justice Holmes dissented, arguing that
copyright protected the “essence” of the work, which could take any form. White-
Smith Music Publ’g Co., 209 U.S. at 19 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
92. See To Restrain a Magic-Lantern Lecture of Ben-Hur, 49 PUBLISHER’S WKLY. 768,
768 (1896) available at http://books.google.com/books?id=0QQDAAAAYAAJ (dis-
cussing the unreported case); Oren Bracha, How Did Film Become Property?,
COPYRIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW 141, 171 (Brad Sherman & Leanne
Wiseman eds., 2012).
93. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 19–20 (Holmes, J., concurring) (arguing that to protect a
work, one must protect its essence).
94. Notes of Important Decisions, Copyrights—Moving Pictures as Dramatization, 73
CENT. L.J. 442 (1911) [hereinafter Copyrights].
95. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 19–20 (Holmes, J., concurring) (arguing that to protect a
work, one must protect its essence).
96. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co., 209 U.S. at 19 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Some
launched scathing criticism of this decision, saying that the court was “substitut-
ing itself for Congress.” Copyrights, supra note 94, at 443.
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The case revealed one of the problems with the 1909 Act: it set
damages at $100 for the first infringing dramatization and $50 for
each subsequent dramatization,98 an amount set with stage plays in
mind.  Whereas plays would usually be performed a handful of times,
motion picture companies were showing their films at thousands of
locations around the country, at multiple times each day.  The stat-
ute’s damage provision combined with widespread film showings ex-
posed motion picture companies to the possibility of tremendously
high damage awards.  The motion picture industry lobbied Congress
to amend the 1909 Act.99  The result was a partial success; the indus-
try managed to create a damage cap for cases of innocent infringement
that could not have been “reasonably foreseen.”100
b. Radio Broadcasting
Radio broadcasting also illustrates how the 1909 Act struggled to
keep pace with new technology.  The 1909 Act secured the owners of
musical copyright the right to perform the work publicly for profit but
did not address how this right would work in a world of radio.101  The
original act contemplated an audience paying a fee to enter and the
musicians then playing the work live.  There was no provision to ac-
commodate the changes that radio would bring.
As broadcasts became more frequent,102 songwriters and publish-
ers increasingly began to view the technology as a threat. Copyright
holders began to bring claims based on radio broadcasting to the
courts.  Among the first was M. Witmark & Sons v. Bamberger.103
Bamberger owned a department store in New Jersey from which he
sold radio sets and operated a radio broadcasting station.  Whitmark
& Sons, owner of copyright in the musical composition Mother
97. GEORGES SADOUL, THE DICTIONARY OF FILMS 29 (Peter Morris ed.) (1972).
98. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §25(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (repealed
1976).
99. See Complete File of Arguments Before the Committee on Patents House of Repre-
sentatives on H.R. 15263 and H.R. 20596, 62d Cong. 8–11 (1912) (Statement of
Frank L. Dyer, Edison Manufacturing Company), available at http://books.
google.com/books?id=8cw0AQAAMAAJ (discussing the fee structure’s negative
implications for the motion picture industry); Litman, supra note 70, 290–91
(summarizing lobbying efforts).
100. Townsend Amendment, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303 § 25(b), 37 Stat. 488, 489 (1912)
(amending Copyright Act 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075; both repealed,
1976).
101. See Copyright Act 1909, § 1(e) (discussing public performance but with no men-
tion of broadcasting).
102. See generally William O. Swinyard, The Development of the Art of Radio Receiv-
ing from the Early 1920’s to the Present, 50 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF
RADIO ENGINEERS 793 (1962) (chronicling the development and spread of radio
technology).
103. M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.C.N.J. 1923).
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Machree, asserted that Bamberger had infringed on the right to per-
form the work in public for profit by broadcasting it on his radio
station.104
The issue in this case was whether the radio broadcast was indeed
“for profit.”105  In the past, one court held that by “for profit,” Con-
gress meant a direct pecuniary charge for the performance, “such as
an admission fee or a fee deposited in a coin-operated machine.”106
Bamberger did not charge a direct fee; consumers received the broad-
cast for free.107  Nevertheless, the court resolved that this was indeed
a profitable performance because the consumers still bought the radio
equipment Bamberger sold in his store in order to receive the
broadcast.108
Profit from performance was one of many issues surrounding radio
broadcasts.  The next question was what counted as a “performance,”
addressed in Jerome H. Remick v. American Automobile Accessories
Co.109  Once again, the defendant sold radio sets and operated a radio
broadcast, this time from Cincinnati.110  He played the musical com-
position Dreamy Melody on his broadcast; the copyright holders
sought damages and an injunction barring future broadcasts for the
piece.111  The question for the court was whether the broadcast
counted as a performance.112  The lower court agreed with the defend-
ants that it did not, finding that when Congress adopted the term, it
had meant performance before a physical “assemblage of persons.”113
To be public, the performance required “an audience congregated for
the purpose of hearing that which transpires at the place of amuse-
ment.”114  In the case of radio that could not be said because the lis-
teners had not assembled physically to take in the performance but
104. Id. at 776–77.
105. Id. at 777.
106. John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 F. 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1915). See also
Herbert v. Shanley, 229 F. 340 (2d Cir. 1916) (finding no infringement when no
admission was charged).
107. M. Witmark & Sons, 291 F. at 773.
108. Id. at 779–80.
109. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 298 F. 628 (S.D. Ohio
1924).
110. Id. at 629.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 631.
113. Id. at 531.
114. Id.  At the same time, the court stated that copyright was a statutory creation not
suitable for common law additions. Id. at 630 (“[I]t is clear that this protection
should not be extended beyond the express language of the statute, nor a prop-
erty right created which was not clearly within the mind of Congress when the
act was passed.”)  This view drew criticism from some. See Current Decisions,
Copyright—Radio Broadcasting Not an Infringement, 34 YALE L.J. 109, 110
(1924) (discussing the holding as an “over strict construction” relying on diction-
ary definitions).
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instead occupied dispersed locations.  However, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals strongly disagreed and stressed the need for flexibil-
ity when construing the Copyright Act.115  With a more flexible con-
struction, the court found that this was a performance because the
broadcast was able to address “a great, though unseen and widely
scattered, audience.”116
Even this more liberal construction did not solve the issue of radio
broadcasts and the public performance rights.  Four years after the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Jerome H. Remick Co., the Supreme Court
faced the issue of what was a “performance.”  In Buck v. Jewell-La
Salle Realty Co., a hotel received the broadcast of an independent sta-
tion and played that music to their customers.117  The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court’s determination that performance occurred in
the radio station when the music was broadcast and was not re-per-
formed by the hotel owner, who merely turned the radio set on.118
Justice Brandeis found novelty was no bar to extending the existing
copyright law; the hotel’s transmission of the performance to its cus-
tomers infringed upon performance rights.119
By the middle of the 1920s, it was clear that the law was out of
date; commentators discussed the statute’s inadequacy in light of
changed technology.120  Industry concerns renewed their efforts to
amend the law.  For example, the radio industry encouraged a number
of bills that exempted them from liability.121  A new regulation of the
115. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories, 5 F.2d 411, 411–12 (6th Cir.
1925).  The court adopted the Holmesian view of copyright law, interpreting stat-
ute dynamically.  In direct answer to the lower court, the Sixth Circuit noted that
new developments were not, for reasons of novelty alone, excluded from the Copy-
right Act. Id. at 411 (holding that until Congress addresses new technologies,
“the statute may be applied to new situations not anticipated by Congress,
[when] such situations come within its intent and meaning” and that statutes
“should not be so narrowly construed as to permit their evasion because
of . . . new inventions and discoveries”).
116. Id. at 412.  In contrast to the criticism of the lower court’s decision, at least one
commentator found the appellate court’s handling of profit issue “proper.”  Recent
Cases, Copyright-Infringement by Radio Broadcasting, 39 HARV. L. REV. 269
(1925).
117. Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 736 (D.C. Cal. 1929) (finding that this act was
“never within the intent of Congress in passing the Copyright Act or within the
reasonable purview of the terms thereof”).
118. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
119. Id. at 198 (“[N]othing in the Act circumscribes the meaning . . . [of] ‘performance,’
or prevents a single rendition . . . from resulting in more than one public perform-
ance . . . .  [T]he novelty of the means used does not lessen the duty of the courts
to give full protection to [rights] which Congress has secured to the composer.”).
120. See, e.g., A.L. Ashby, Legal Aspects of Radio Broadcasting, 1 AIR L. REV. 331, 342
(1930).
121. See, e.g., H.R. 8166, 68th Cong. (1924); S. 2328, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 10353,
69th Cong. (1926); S. 4467, 70th Cong. (1928); Paul Gitlin, Radio Infringement of
Music Copyright, 1 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMPOSIUM (1939), reprinted in 46 J.
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radio and telecommunications issue was eventually embodied in the
Communications Act of 1934.122
c. Cable Television
A final illustrative story is that of cable television, also known as
Community Access Television (CATV).  A technical handicap plagued
regular broadcast television.  The signals were limited in reach and
could be disturbed by features of the land (hilly terrain, for example).
To avoid this problem large receivers (“community antenna”) were er-
ected around the country.  The receivers picked up television signals,
then used cables to transmit those signals into peoples’ homes.  Those
who owned copyright in the broadcast material argued that these re-
transmissions were unlicensed public performances123 but yet again,
the Copyright Act was silent on the use of this technology.
The controversy resulted in two split decisions from the Supreme
Court.  In 1968, the Court decided Fortnightly Corp v. United Art-
ists.124  The lower courts relied on Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.
and concluded that transmission from the community antennas to
homes counted as a public performance.125  Despite this precedent,
and the solicitor general’s strong agreement with the lower court deci-
sion as amicus curiae,126 the Court found no performance.127  In the
Fortnightly Court’s view, working out the appropriate legal regime
was a “job for Congress;”128 the Court must take the Copyright Act as
it found it.129  The issue reared its head again only six years later;
new technological features in CATV allowed the retransmitter to in-
sert advertisements into the original programming.  The Court’s
stance remained the same: regulation was still a task for Congress.130
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 7, 15–17 (1998) (describing industry lobbying efforts);
Justin Miller, Principles of Law Limiting Radio Broadcasting, 9 F.R.D. 217
(1949).
122. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064.
123. The original broadcasters had already negotiated licenses with the copyright
holders to perform this content.
124. Fortnightly Corp v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
125. Fortnightly Corp v. United Artists, 377 F.2d 872, 877 (2d Cir.1967).
126. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 401.
127. Id.  The split once again was along institutional lines.  While the majority felt
that Congress was the forum to deal with such issues, Justice Fortas acknowl-
edged that the case called “not for the judgment of Solomon but for the dexterity
of Houdini.” Id. at 402 (Fortas, J., dissenting).  In his view, “applying the normal
jurisprudential tools—the words of the Act, legislative history, and precedent—to
the facts of the case is like trying to repair a television set with a mallet.” Id. at
403.
128. Id. at 401 (majority opinion).
129. Id. at 401–02 (“We take the Copyright Act of 1909 as we find it.”).
130. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974).
Once again the Court was split on institutional lines.  The majority held that
“detailed regulation of these relationships . . . must be left to Congress,” id., while
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3. The Copyright Act 1976
By the 1960s, the time for change was long overdue.  Courts had
“stretched the limits of statutory language”131 to make the 1909 Act
serviceable, but it was no longer enough.  New technology repeatedly
forced the judiciary to reconsider the nature of copyright and the re-
spective roles that the court and legislature played.  While some were
prepared to avoid under-inclusive law through judicial activism,
others stuck to the statutory vision of copyright upheld in the previous
centuries.  This recurring struggle within the judiciary made it neces-
sary for Congress to step in and revisit copyright.  As technology’s
pace did not show any sign of abating, a new and less rigid copyright
act was desired.
The new legislation structured the author’s exclusive rights in a
dramatically different fashion than the 1909 Act.  The experience
under the 1909 Act demonstrated that narrowly constructed, rule-
based copyright leads to under-inclusivity as technology changes the
market.  Congress was more aware than ever of the need to provide
regulation that would keep pace with innovation.  As the Copyright
Office said:
The structural stresses of an outmoded law is also felt most keenly here. To
the extent that the courts have stretched the limits of the statutory language,
our “ancient” 1909 law has been made serviceable in the face of technological
change. To the extent that courts have not been able to do this (for example, in
the case of cable television and photocopying), we are left with a turn-of-the
century statute in the age of computers, communication satellites and space
travel.132
Due to the Copyright Office’s desire to prevent excess narrowness
in the law, they recommended recasting “the exclusive rights provi-
sions of the law in broad, simple terms.”133  Other members of Con-
the dissent was in “full agreement” with Justice Fortas’s dissent in Fortnightly,
id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 857, 857–58 (1987).
132. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 94TH CONG., BRIEFING PAPERS ON CURRENT ISSUES
RAISED BY H.R. 2223, MAY 7, 1975, reprinted in 16 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2051, 2053 (George S. Grossman ed., 2001) [hereinafter OM-
NIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION].
133. Id.  See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW:
1965 REVISION BILL, pt. 6, at 13–14, (May 1965), reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COPY-
RIGHT REVISION, supra note 132, pt. 6, ch. 2, at 13–14 (noting the difficulty of
foreseeing technological changes, recommending adoption of “a general approach
aimed at providing compensation to the author for future as well as present uses
of his work that materially affect the value of his copyright” to guard against
“confining the scope of an author’s rights on the basis of the present technology so
that, as the years go by, his copyright loses much of its value because of unfore-
seen technical advances”); Litman, supra note 70, at 321 (“The Copyright Office
had committed itself to seeking a consensus solution, and consensus jelled
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gress and industry alike agreed with this tack.  John Schulman,
Chairman of the American Patent Law Association Committee on
Copyright, said the approach of the law should be to adopt “broad lan-
guage so that it is all inclusive.”134  John Summers, General Counsel
for the National Association of Broadcasters, described the law as one
“which, in all likelihood, will stand for many years to come” and there-
fore which “must be flexible, for the future holds in store even newer
technologies.”135  Even more illustrative are the words of Kenneth
Keating of American Book Company:
Most laws are written in response to past behavior. The copyright law must be
prospective, taking into account the ingenious methods and devices that will
transmit information in the future. For this reason the technical language of
the copyright law will be very significant. It will be important to avoid too
narrow language, which might inadvertently become too restrictive in the fu-
ture. General language, when it is pertinent, may be more desirable.136
Perhaps these words of industry representatives are somewhat self-
serving and ought to be taken with a grain of salt.  Still, they do re-
present the types of argument that successfully persuaded Congress
to drop specific, rule-based copyright entitlements dropped in favor of
broad, flexible rights.  Keeping the statutory wording general in-
creased the courts’ discretion to extend the legal framework to new
technologies.  As Professor Litman has explained, the use of general
language in the 1976 Act “solved the problem of accommodating fu-
ture technology” by casting authors’ rights broadly to encompass new
technologically facilitated uses of the work.137
When it came to derivative works, the need for flexibility was also
present.  The Register of Copyrights recommended that “the kinds of
works to be protected . . . be specified in terms broad enough to cover
everything now considered copyrightable, including future works
presented in newly developed forms or media,”138 thus freeing the
around a strategy of granting broad rights in an expansive field of copyrightable
works and subjecting the rights to specific, narrowly tailored exceptions.”).
134. TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW: DISCUSSIONS OF §§ 5–8 (Feb. 20, 1963) (statement of John Schulman), re-
printed in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note 132, at 116.
135. Copyright Law Revision, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
& the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., pt.
2, at 780 (1975) (statement of John Summers, General Counsel, National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters), reprinted in 15 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note
132, at 780.
136. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUB-
COMM. NO. 3 OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, pt. 1, at 63 (Comm. Print 1966)
(statement of Kenneth B. Keating, on behalf of American Book Co. and other
book publishers, May 26, 1965), reprinted in 5 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION,
supra note 132, at 63.
137. Litman, supra note 70, at 281.
138. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, pt. 1, at v (Comm. Print
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courts from the statutory restrictions of the 1909 Act. The drafters
therefore used a standard to define the scope of the derivative right.
Using the “any other form” language in the definition made the right
less rigid and fixed in time, while giving the court the ability to stretch
the provision to new technologies.
Naturally, this did not mean that every possible new work would be
a derivative work, no matter how loosely it was connected to the au-
thor’s original.  Some upper limit logically had to exist on the deriva-
tive work right.139  On this ground, Congress rejected one proposal to
give authors control over “derivative utilizations” of their work.140
However, the drafters were so concerned with keeping the law flexi-
ble, that the statutory wording focused more on what the courts could
do, rather than what they could not: the standards-based approach
was permissive, rather than restrictive.  Reducing the limits on the
derivative work concept would ensure that under-inclusivity would no
longer be a problem.  Unlike the 1909 Act, which, according to Abe
Goldman (General Counsel of the Copyright Office), was “limited” to
“specified kinds of new versions,” this new law was “broad” to cover
“all works and all kinds of new works.”141
C. Derivative Works in Twentieth Century U.K. Copyright
Ironically, on the other side of the Atlantic, the opposite story was
unfolding in the U.K.  While the U.S. was struggling with under-in-
clusivity, the U.K. was struggling with over-inclusivity. Parliament
worried that poorly drafted language could lead to the author control-
ling uses of his work that should be outside the scope of his right.  The
perceived problem of over-inclusivity eventually led the Parliament to
1961) (summary of the report), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION,
supra note 132, at v.
139. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (noting that under the new law, to be a
violation, “the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work
in some form”), reprinted in 17 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note 132, at
62.
140. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1964 REVISION BILL
WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS, pt. 5, 216 (Comm. Print 1965) (statement of
Bella Linden regarding derivative works during a meeting on the 1964 revision
bill, noting, “[T]he word ‘adaptation’ . . . cuts down rather than amplifies the
intention of including in a ‘derivative work’ any work ‘based upon’ one or more
pre-existing works,” suggesting instead a more expansive set of “derivative utili-
zations”), reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note 132, pt. 5, at
216; id. at 58 (statement of Edward Sarogy during the same meeting, asserting
that the term “derivative utilizations” better accounts for adaptations, like dra-
matizations, which cannot be fixed in physical form), reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COP-
YRIGHT REVISION, supra note 132, pt. 5, at 58.
141. TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW: DISCUSSIONS OF §§ 5–8 (Feb. 20, 1963) (statement of Abe Goldman), re-
printed in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note 132, at 109.
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adopt a rule-based approach to adaptations.  Clearly defining the au-
thor’s right would prevent over-inclusivity, while flexibility to deal
with technological change could be found elsewhere in the system.
1. The 1911 Act and the Gramophone Case
Like the U.S., the U.K. adopted a new copyright law at the start of
the century.  The 1911 Copyright Act gave the author the right to copy
the work, defined expansively to include the right to adapt the work.
The statute stated specifically that the right to copy would include the
ability to translate the work, to convert dramatic works into nondra-
matic works, to convert nondramatic works into dramatic works, and
to mechanically deliver the work through mediums such as motion
picture.142
The most important event to shape the history of the U.K.’s adap-
tation right came in the 1930s and involved the issue of public per-
formance rights of gramophones.  The 1911 Act granted gramophone
producers the exclusive right to copy their records and granted the
right holder the exclusive right to perform these works publicly.  How-
ever, the legislative history made clear that this right was intended to
extinguish when a customer bought a record.
During the parliamentary committee preceding the 1911 Act, the
issue of public performance rights in gramophone records had arisen.
The Gramophone Company made a request that they be given a public
performance right but also explained that this right would transfer to
the record buyer upon sale.  The committee chairman, Lord Gorrell,
specifically quizzed the Gramophone Company representative on this
point.  He asked him: “Let us understand the position, that the pur-
chaser of a disc should not merely acquire the right to use it in his own
private surroundings like the singing of a song, but to use it in pub-
lic?”143  To which the representative responded, “yes.”144  Elaborating
on this answer, the representative stated: “We think it is perfectly rea-
sonable to grant that concession.  It is not a matter that would affect
us personally as manufacturers, but it would affect a considerable
number of our clients and customers.”145  Trying to maintain absolute
clarity on this matter, Gorrell posed a follow-up question: “[t]hen, buy-
ing any rights from the author originally would include that right of
public performance on the part of any purchaser of the disc from the
manufacturers?”146  Once again, the answer was affirmative.147
142. Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 2 (Eng.), available at http://www.legis-
lation.gov.uk/ukpga/1911/46/pdfs/ukpga_19110046_en.pdf.
143. BOARD OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, 1909, Cd.
4976, at 50 (U.K.).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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However, Parliament failed to draft the Copyright Act’s provision
on gramophones in a way that reflected this outcome.  At one point,
the statute provided that copyright existed in gramophone records “in
like manner as if such contrivances were musical works.”148  Musical
works were subject to a performance right that did not extinguish
upon sale of the work.  The Gramophone Company later exploited this
lax language and used it to their advantage.
In 1931, Gramophone Company brought a case against Stephen
Carwardine.149  Carwardine owned and ran a series of coffee and tea
shops around England.  Gramophone Company accused him of playing
one of their records in his shop in Bristol.  The gramophone in ques-
tion was a recording of Daniel Auber’s 1831 composition The Black
Domino performed by the London Symphony Orchestra.  By this time,
the original musical composition was in the public domain.  The
Gramophone Company therefore had no public performance rights in
the musical composition.  To prevent Carwardine’s actions, Gramo-
phone Company could only argue that Carwardine had infringed the
right of public performance attached to the gramophone record.
Under that theory, Gramopohone argued that their copyright existed
“in like manner” as musical works, and, therefore, their right of public
performance did not extinguish upon the sale of the record to Car-
wardine.  Without consulting legislative history, Justice Maugham
agreed with the Gramophone Company’s construction of this provi-
sion, and with that, a new right within the copyright framework
emerged.150  As a result of legislative ambiguity, the court fundamen-
tally altered copyright in gramophones in a way that many disliked.
The chagrin rooted at the heart of this decision was that it made
way for another collecting society.  Within a year, the newfound abil-
ity of gramophone producers to control the public performance of
records made it profitable to set up Phonographic Performance Ltd., a
collecting society for the licensing of gramophone performance rights.
This came at a time when the public was already unhappy about ex-
isting collecting societies.  They were perceived as monopolists, charg-
ing exorbitant prices.151  This anger had reached such a pitch that
147. Id.
148. Copyright Act 1911, supra note 142, §19(1).
149. Gramophone Company Ltd. v. Stephen Cawardine & Co., [1934] 1 Ch. 450.
150. Id. at 459.
151. See, e.g., Commons and Music Copyright: Performing Rights Society Attacked
“THIS OCTOPUS” Exorbitant Charges Alleged, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Nov. 23,
1929, at 18; Super-Monopoly in Music: Safeguards Needed APPEAL TRIBUNAL
SUGGESTED, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, July 12, 1930, at 20; Musical Copyright
Bill: “Monopoly Power” Attacked CRITICISM OF PERFORMING RIGHT SOCI-
ETY, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 1930, at 15.
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Parliament had been forced to address the issue a mere three years
earlier.152
2. The Copyright Act 1956 and the Copyright, Designs, and
Patents Act 1988
When the U.K. came to revise its law in the 1950s, the gramophone
controversy continued.  In 1952, a report from the Copyright Commit-
tee was openly hostile to the gramophone public performance right.153
They found it difficult to accept the principle that someone should be
able to control the use of a good after the sale of it154 and highlighted
the negative effects that this had on prices.155  This controversy con-
tinued as the members of Parliament began to discuss copyright revi-
sion.156  One parliamentarian lambasted this state of affairs because
“it was never intended by parliament” and it “came into the Act . . . by
a side wind.”157
So great was this controversy that it affected how Parliament
viewed other issues in copyright.  This was particularly the case with
adaptations.  The new Act provided the author with a right to make
adaptations and defined adaptation in a narrow, rule-based fashion.
The term adaptation was defined as follows:
In this Act “adaptation”—
(a) in relation to a literary or dramatic work, means any of the following,
that is to say,—
(i) in the case of a non-dramatic work, a version of the work
(whether in its original language or a different language) in which it
is converted into a dramatic work;
152. See Musical Copyright Bill, HANSARD, available at http://hansard.millbanksys-
tems.com/commons/1929/nov/01/musical-copyright-bill (last visited Feb. 7,
2014).
153. The Report of the Copyright Committee presented by the President of the Board
of Trade to Parliament in October 1952 (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office)
(Reprinted 1968).
154. Id. at 51 (“[W]e should have found it difficult in any event to accept the conten-
tion that, after selling his wares for a price which he himself has fixed, the record
manufacturer was thereafter justified in controlling the use to which they were
subsequently put, or of preventing their use altogether.  This principle, if applied
generally in trade, would produce astonishing results.”).
155. Id. at 52 (“After the decision in the Cawardine case licenses were at first freely
issued.  This is no longer the position.  Phonographic Performance, Ltd., like the
Performing Right Society does not issue licenses freely.  The rates naturally differ
between the different classes of performance and the nature of the occasion of the
performance, Ltd., pays 20 per cent of the net distributable revenue for the bene-
fit of the artistes who have recorded. . . .  The company undoubtedly does control
the rights in gramophone records amounting in fact, to something very little
short of a monopoly so far as users are concerned.”).
156. 511 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1953) 1905–1906 (U.K.) (comments of Mr.
Hudson).
157. 179 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1953) 1147 (U.K.).
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(ii) in the case of a dramatic work, a version of the work (whether
in its original language or a different language) in which it is con-
verted into a non-dramatic work;
(iii) a translation of the work;
(iv) a version of the work in which the story or action is conveyed
wholly or mainly by the means of pictures in a form suitable for repro-
duction in a book, or in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical;
and
(b) In relation to a musical work, means an arrangement or transcription
of the work, . . .158
During the legislative debates, some members of Parliament ar-
gued that clause (a) should be amended and that the word “means”
should be replaced with the word “include.”  Such an alteration would
transform the exhaustive list of protected adaptations into an open-
ended set of examples.  Lord Lucas was one such voice advocating for
the use of the word “include.” He recognized that this was the first
time that legislation attempted to define the concept of adaptation and
believed that they “better do the job completely.”159  He believed this
approach superior because it covered “every possible adaptation that
one could think of.”160  However, his proposal was rejected.  Lord
Mancroft, one of the opponents to the proposal, explained that in-
serting the word “includes” might “open the door to disputes and liti-
gation.”161  This, he felt, was one thing they were “seeking to
avoid.”162  The experience of Carwardine demonstrated how litigation
could lead to the formation of undesirable law over which Parliament
had little control, and the drafters were reluctant to risk a repeat
through more loose language.  Earl Jowitt, referencing the gramo-
phone public performance right when refusing to adopt the word “in-
clude,” said the following:
We do want to get this matter as clear as we can, and we must have in our
minds for ever the unfortunate matter that arose under the last Copyright Act
when, by a misadventure which was never intended by Parliament, a new
right was given because the language was unfortunate. That must be our ex-
cuse, if any is needed, for scrutinising this Bill particularly carefully.163
Mancroft agreed with this sentiment and concurred that they did not
want any “mischances as occurred last time.”164  The word “include”
was, therefore, not adopted.
In 1988, the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act was replaced by
the Copyright Act.  This new Act retained the rule-based approach to
adaptations and is still the governing statute presently.165  Once
158. Copyright Act 1956, § 2(6) (U.K.) (emphasis added).
159. 194 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1955) 862 (U.K.).
160. Id. at 863.
161. Id. at 864.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 865.
164. Id. at 866.
165. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 21(3) (U.K.).
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again, however, some suggested that the provision ought to be broader
in order to deal with unforeseen technologies.166  Others, however, felt
that this flexibility already existed elsewhere in the copyright system.
The author’s exclusive right to copy was defined not only to include
the ability to prohibit verbatim copies, but also the ability to prohibit
the copying of a “substantial part”167 of his work in “any material
form.”168  This provided enough flexibility for the courts to include fu-
ture technological advancements as and when necessary.169  As a re-
sult, no changes were made to the adaptation definition and the rule-
based approach still governs today.170
166. Sir Geoffrey Pattie pointed out such need for flexibility. See 132 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(6th ser.) (1988) 541 (U.K.) (questioning whether the adaptation definition “ade-
quately prepare[d] the way forward to cover developing technologies”).  Pattie
went on to note that “[n]o one expects the Government to go in for futurology to
such an extent that they can anticipate what technology may throw up in the
next 10 or 15 years, but somehow the Bill must find a way of providing a frame-
work to cope with problems as they develop.” Id.  Pattie ultimately felt that this
was “extremely narrow” and in that respect “inadequate” to deal with the future
technologies that would arise. Id.  He preferred an adaptation clause that was
informed by the view that the “copyright is a broad and simple concept” infringed
upon by the appropriation of ideas. Id. at 542.
167. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 16(3) (U.K.).
168. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 17(2) (U.K.).
169. 490 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1987) 1173 (U.K.) (Lord Beaverbrook stating that
although there was a tendency for copyright to become “too rigid to adapt to par-
ticular or changing circumstances” this could be avoided because the “undefined
concept of ‘substantial part’ gives the law a desirable, indeed a necessary,
flexibility”).
170. This approach is still the governing law today.  However, two additions were
made to the law post 1988.  The right today gives the creators of computer pro-
grams and databases the right to make “arrangements,” “altered versions,” and
“translations.” Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 2, § 21(3) (U.K.).
These rights were imported into British law in order to comply with EU
directions.
The provision on copyright programs was a response to EU Directive 91/250/
EEC on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 14 May 1991.  The provision
on databases was a response to EU Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of
Databases, 11 March 1996.  Each of these was then introduced into the law by
secondary legislation. See The Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations,
1992, S.I. 1992/3233; The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations, 1997,
S.I. 1997/3032.  Interestingly, due to their importation via secondary legislation,
Parliament did not debate these provisions.  It is very much an open question
what the drafters of the Copyright Act 1956 or CDPA 1988 would have thought of
these provisions.
In the only case in which the provision on adaptations of computer programs
was raised, the court refused to interpret the statutory wording. See Point Solu-
tions Ltd. v. Focus Business Solutions Ltd., Focus Solutions Group, PLC., [2005]
EWHC (Ch) 3096 (Eng.).  Other litigation surrounding computer programs and
databases has concerned the right of reproduction. See, e.g., John Richardson
Computers Ltd. v. Flanders, [1993] F.S.R. (Ch) 497 (Eng.); IBCOS Computers v.
Barclays Mercantile Highland Fin. Ltd., [1994] F.S.R. (Ch) 275 (Eng.); Attheraces
Ltd. v. British Horseracing Board Ltd., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 38 (Eng.); Autospin
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D. Summary
The historical analysis reveals the tension from which the modern
derivative work right was formed.  A restrictively written, rule-based
approach to derivative works may leave the law stagnant, unable to
incorporate new technologies into the copyright system.  As demon-
strated by the U.S. experience with new technologies under the 1909
Act, the law could become under-inclusive, leaving authors defense-
less against new forms of copying.  To avoid such under-inclusivity,
the U.S. relied on a standards-based approach to derivative works
that could flexibly incorporate new technology-enabled adaptations.
On the other hand, writing vague, general terminology into the law
is also dangerous.  As demonstrated by the U.K. experience with the
gramophone case, the loosely crafted statutory language could lead to
rapidly expanding law.  The U.K., therefore, hoped to find some mid-
dle ground.  Parliament chose to restrain the potential for over-in-
clusivity in the adaptation right by adopting a rule-based approach to
the issue.  Unlike the U.S. 1909 Act, however, they mitigated any po-
tential for under-inclusivity by relying on flexibility in the right of
reproduction.
II. MODERN DOCTRINE OF THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN COPYRIGHT
Since the U.S. and U.K. adopted different legislative solutions to
the derivative work right, U.S. law has become much broader than its
U.K. counterpart.  The lack of limits on the U.S. derivative work con-
cept allows the right to easily extend to novel types of derivative
works.  The situation is different in the U.K.  Novel derivative works
do not infringe the adaptation right because they are not specifically
mentioned within the statute.  In this case, the derivative work will
only infringe copyright if it infringes the right of reproduction.  How-
ever, not all derivative works are capable of infringing the right of
reproduction.  As a result, many derivative works that infringe U.S.
copyright by virtue of the broad derivative work right, do not infringe
either the U.K.’s right to make adaptations or its right of reproduc-
tion.  To demonstrate the difference, this part shall first provide an
overview of the U.S. and U.K. reproduction and derivative work
rights.  It shall then use specific examples of novel derivative works to
illustrate when the systems produce different results and when they
produce analogous results.
(Oil Seas) Ltd. v. Beehive Spinning [1995] 23 R.P.C. (Ch) 683 (Eng.); Cantor Fitz-
gerald Int’l v. Traditional (U.K.) Ltd., [2000] 4 R.P.C. (Ch) 95 (Eng.); Designers
Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd., [2001] F.S.R. (H.L.) 11 (Eng.).  A
special thanks goes to Jeremy Phillips who asked the readers of the “1709 Blog”
whether they could think of any cases in which these provisions were interpreted.
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A. The Right of Reproduction
The right of reproduction is quite similar in the U.K. and the U.S.
Both have flexible rights that use market competition to determine
infringement.
1. The U.K. Doctrine
In the U.K., authors are provided with a right to make copies.171
To infringe this right, the defendant must factually copy the protected
work.  This requires a reproduction of the protected expression found
in the author’s work.  However, factual copying need not take place in
the same form.  Copying in the statute “means reproducing the work
in any material form.”172  Therefore, taking a photograph of a paint-
ing would be a reproduction; the expression does not change, only the
form in which it is presented.  At the same time, the infringer need not
copy the whole amount of the expression.  Infringement will occur if a
“substantial part” of the protected work is copied.173
When determining if infringement has occurred, the courts ask
whether the defendant’s work competes in the market with the plain-
tiff’s work.  Most cited for this proposition is Weatherby & Sons v. In-
ternational Horse Agency and Exchange Ltd.,174 where the court held
that the “real and only test as to whether or not the defendants have
made an unfair use of [the copyright holder’s work] lies in the answer
to the question [of] whether there will be any competition between
such volume and the defendant’s book.”175  More recently, Ravenscroft
v. Herbert held that market competition was important in determining
what counted as a “substantial part.”176
As a practical illustration of the role of competition, consider Sil-
litoe v. McGraw-Hill Book Co. Ltd.177  The claimants were the copy-
right holders of a number of plays.  The defendants distributed “study
notes” for these plays.  These were companion books aimed at stu-
dents.  They summarized the plays of the claimant and offered analy-
sis and criticism.  In doing so, they copied small passages of the works.
The copied text extracts totaled five percent of the copyright holder’s
work.  The claimants alleged that these infringed the right of repro-
duction.  However, it was questionable whether any meaningful quali-
tative or quantitative copying had occurred.  The five percent figure
was relatively small, and it was not clear whether the defendants took
the most vital parts.  The issue, therefore, was greatly influenced by
171. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 16(1)(a) (U.K.).
172. Id. § 17(2).
173. Id. § 16(3)(a).
174. [1910] 2 Ch. 297.
175. Id. at 304–05.
176. [1980] 7 R.P.C. 193, 203.
177. [1983] F.S.R. 545.
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the nature of competition between the works.  The claimant’s lawyer
argued that the study notes were a “commercially competitive substi-
tute” that students could buy instead of reading the entire play.178
This argument was aided by the fact that the defendant’s works came
with an attached disclaimer saying that: “[t]he notes are not a substi-
tute for the text itself . . . and the student who so attempts to use them
is denying himself . . . [an] education.”179  The defendant tried to mar-
ket these as a “supplementary aid” rather than a competitor.180  How-
ever, the very fact that a disclaimer was necessary in order to inform
readers that the notes should not be considered as substitutes for the
original plays was indicative of real market competition.  Students
would buy the defendant’s works as opposed to the original works.  It
was therefore held to be a copyright infringement.
2. U.S. Doctrine
Likewise, in the U.S., the author is given a right to make copies.181
Copies are defined as a “material object” in which a “work is fixed” and
“from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated.”182  Once again, in order to infringe this right, some of the
expression must be reproduced.  However, the copying need not take
the same form.  Copying may be nonliteral.183
The new, copied work will infringe copyright if it is substantially
similar to the original work.  Although there is some variation be-
tween the circuits on the precise test, a work will usually be substan-
tially similar if a consumer would perceive the two works as
substitutes.  The Second Circuit will label a copy as substantially sim-
ilar if the defendant “took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is
pleasing” to the audience for whom the original work was composed
“that defendant wrongfully appropriated something.”184  The Ninth
Circuit, similarly, has stated that a work will be substantially similar
if an “ordinary, reasonable audience would find the works substan-
tially similar in total concept and feel.”185  This ordinary, reasonable
audience varies to reflect the consumer for which the original work
was developed.  For example, in a case involving video games aged at
teenage boys, the court said the audience that had to perceive similar-
ities was the 17.5-year-old boy.186  The question of substantial simi-
178. Id. at 560.
179. Id. at 553.
180. Id. at 545.
181. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
182. Id. at § 101.
183. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
184. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
185. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002).
186. Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209–10 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1988); see
also Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990) (“When
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larity is analogous to the competitive relationship test in the U.K.  If
consumers perceive similarities, the works are economic substitutes in
their eyes.  The two works, therefore, would compete in the market for
the consumers’ patronage.  If this is the case, the second work is sub-
stantially similar to the first work.187
B. The Derivative Work Rights
Although the U.S. and U.K. adopted different derivative work
rights, there are still some similarities between the adaptation right
in the U.K. and the derivative work right in the U.S.  Particularly,
they both give the author some control over ancillary markets, i.e. dif-
ferent markets to the one that the original work occupies.  As Profes-
sor Goldstein has articulated, “motion pictures, translations and
comic strips based on [a] novel will all infringe the derivative right
because they add new expressive elements and serve markets that dif-
fer from the market in which the original was first introduced.”188
This is different to the right of reproduction, which is infringed when a
defendant’s work enters into the same market as the one that the orig-
inal occupies.
However, from that group of potential derivative works, U.K. law
is far narrower.  Where the U.S. gives every author the right to ex-
clude any type of derivative work,189 the U.K.’s law precisely states
what types of adaptation the author can exclude from ancillary mar-
kets.190  If the original author creates a literary work, this right en-
ables him to translate the work, to make the work into a dramatic
work, and to make a version of the work in which the story is por-
trayed through pictures.  The authors of dramatic works receive the
exclusive right to transform the work into a nondramatic form.  The
authors of musical works receive the right to arrange or transcribe
their works.  Finally, both computer programs and databases receive
the right to make arrangements, altered versions, or translations.191
Therefore, while the U.S. allows the courts to incrementally advance
the scope of the derivative right, the U.K. binds the courts’ hands
through clear statutory wording.
conducting the second prong of the substantial similarity inquiry, a district court
must consider the nature of the intended audience of the plaintiff’s work.”).
187. See Paul Goldstein, supra note 54, at 217 (where a second work does not create “a
new market,” it is likely to infringe the reproduction right rather than the adap-
tation right).
188. Paul Goldstein, supra note 54, at 217.
189. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “derivative work”).
190. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 21(3) (U.K.).
191. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 170.
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C. The Differences Between the Two Approaches
Having provided an overview of the two regimes, we can now look
at some instances where the two approaches lead to different case out-
comes.  Due to the lack of internal limits on the definition of derivative
work, U.S. authors can exclude a far greater number of derivative
works from the market than U.K. authors can.  These derivative
works often do not infringe the U.K. adaptation right and often do not
reproduce sufficient protected expression to infringe the right of
reproduction.
1. Supplementary Works
The U.S. derivative works right allows the author to control adap-
tations that, while incorporating very little or no content from the
original work, build on that work in some supplementary fashion.
One illustrative example comes from the Worlds of Wonder cases.192
In these cases, the plaintiff manufactured a toy teddy bear, called
Teddy Ruxpin.  Inside each bear was a cassette tape that made the
bear speak and move.  The defendants produced their own cassette
tapes for use in the plaintiff’s bears.  These cassette tapes also allowed
the bear to speak and move.  However, the speech used was entirely
different.  Rather than copy the wording used in the plaintiff’s cas-
settes, the defendants’ cassettes performed public domain fairytales.
The court held this was an infringement of the derivative work right.
The court found substantial similarity based on the similitude of the
voices in each tape, the method and sound for signaling the end of a
section of speech, and the similar visual movement performed by the
bear.
This situation is unlikely in the U.K.  The adaptation right pro-
vides no ability for the creator of Teddy Ruxpin to control the market
for interoperable tapes.  The artistic copyright in the bear is not in-
fringed by the making of the derivative tapes,193 while the sound re-
cording copyright in the cassette tapes receives no adaptation right at
all.194  Nor would this infringe the right of reproduction.  The defen-
dant neither copied any artistic qualities of the bear nor any of the
speech actually found on the plaintiff’s cassette tapes.  But even more
salient is the lack of a competitive nature between these works.  The
defendants’ work did not supplant the demand for the plaintiff’s work.
Instead, in order to use the defendants’ tapes, the consumer had to
first buy the plaintiff’s bear.  If anything, this may have had a comple-
mentary effect on the plaintiff’s sales; more people would buy the bear
because of the increased story-telling options presented by the defend-
192. See cases cited supra note 6.
193. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 21(3) (U.K.).
194. Id.
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ants’ work.  As a result, this would be unlikely to infringe the U.K.
reproduction right.
One other infamous case further illustrates this point.  In Castle
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.,195 the de-
fendants produced a trivia book about the popular TV show Seinfeld
(The Seinfeld Aptitude Test).  The book contained 550 trivia questions
about the plot and characters in the show, forty-one of which included
direct quotation from the show. Most quoted was an episode called the
Cigar Store Indian from which between 3.6% to 5.6% of the dialogue
was quoted.  The court held this amounted to quantitative copying,
and this was, therefore, a substantially similar work, which infringed
copyright.196
Such a use would not infringe the U.K. right to make adaptations.
The author of an audio–visual program has no statutory right to make
supplementary works like the Seinfeld Aptitude Test.  At the same
time, claiming the defendant’s work was a reproduction would involve
making a spurious argument that it competed in the market with the
plaintiff’s work.  It is highly unlikely that a consumer with demand for
the TV show would be able to satisfy that demand through buying the
trivia book.  Indeed, in the Sillitoe case, the defendant’s main argu-
ment was that his study notes were supplementary works.  The defen-
dant recognized that, if the court were to classify the study notes as
supplementary works, then liability would be unlikely.
2. Unfixed Adaptations
This refers to a situation where the defendant creates a product
that, when used in conjunction with the plaintiff’s original work, mod-
ifies that original work.  However, when the two goods, the defen-
dant’s product and the copyrighted work, are not used in conjunction,
no derivative work occurs.  The derivative work is therefore not fixed
but is temporary and contingent upon other factors.
This controversy was presented in Midway Manufacturing Co. v.
Artic International, Inc.197  The plaintiff in this case made video
games.  These games functioned through the use of internal circuit
boards.  The circuit boards were capable of causing pictures and
sounds to appear on a television screen, and as such, they were pro-
tectable as audio-visual works.  In order to use the video games, the
customer had to own a particular machine that facilitated the transac-
tion between circuit board and television display.  The defendant also
sold circuit boards.  These were not copies of the plaintiff’s boards, and
195. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
196. See also Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1370 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that a book based on the TV show Twin Peaks infringed
copyright).
197. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
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they did not reproduce any of the images and sound that afforded the
plaintiff’s work copyright protection.  But when the defendant’s boards
were entered into the machine alongside the plaintiff’s boards, the na-
ture of the video game changed.  For example, one such board sped up
the video game, thereby making the pictures and sound displays
faster than normal.  One other altered the sounds of the video game
altogether.  These adaptations, however, were unfixed.  They were
temporary and not permanent.  If the defendant’s board was removed,
the plaintiff’s video game returned instantly to its original state.  The
court held this to infringe the general derivative works right.
But the same result could not happen in the U.K.  The adaptation
right does not provide the author of audio–visual the exclusive right to
make interoperable circuit boards.  In which case, the copyright
holder’s only hope is to demonstrate that this use of his work counts as
a reproduction.  Yet, this is plainly not a reproduction.  The defendant
has not in fact reproduced any of the protected expression; he has
merely created something that interacts with the expression.  Fur-
thermore, there is certainly no competitive market relationship be-
tween these products.  These works were not substitutes, but instead
complements.  In order to use the defendant’s work, the consumer had
to already have bought the plaintiff’s video game.  As a result, demand
for the plaintiff’s work was not diminished by the defendant’s work.
3. Mounting the Work
An example of mounting can be found in Mirage Editions, Inc. v.
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.198  The plaintiff in this case published books
of artwork.  The defendants bought these works, cut the artwork out,
glued the artwork onto ceramic tiles, and sold the tiles to the public.
The court held this infringed the copyright because the defendant had
made “another version” of the plaintiff’s work.199
On the other hand, the same situation does not occur under U.K.
law.  The authors of artistic works (or any other work) do not receive a
right to mount the work.  The only way for these works to infringe
copyright is if they are deemed reproductions.  But such an outcome is
impossible because neither defendant reproduced the protected ex-
pression.  The defendant had not actually copied the work resulting in
a duplicate.  They had only modified the original.  As a result, there is
no competitive relationship between the two works.  Indeed, they are
not two works at all but the same work at different stages in time.  In
198. 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Mun˜oz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F.
Supp. 309, 314–15 (D. Alaska 1993) (holding “the decision in Mirage compels the
court’s conclusion: ART violated the Mun˜oz copyrights”); Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125
F.3d 580, 582–83 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding the opposite to Mirage Editions on very
similar facts).
199. Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1343.
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addition, the European Union equivalent of the first-sale doctrine ap-
plies.200  The author’s economic rights in the specific goods the defen-
dant bought have exhausted upon sale.  The defendant, therefore,
does not infringe an author’s economic rights if he mounts or rear-
ranges those goods and then sells them.
4. Sampling Small Quantities
The next issue to illustrate the differences is that of sampling
small amounts.  This refers to the use of digital technology to extract a
portion of music from a sound recording and to thereafter include that
extraction somehow in a new sound recording.  The U.S. has contro-
versially found that this infringes copyright law.  In Bridgeport Music
Inc. v. Dimension Films,201 a sample was taken from the plaintiff’s
work.  The sample was two seconds long.  The defendant thereafter
lowered the pitch of the sample, looped it, and extended it for sixteen
beats.  The sample was then repeated five times throughout the song.
The court held this to be an infringement.
Once again, the situation would be different in the U.K.  The con-
cept of adaptation is defined restrictively not to include sound record-
ings.  In order to demonstrate infringement, the plaintiffs would be
required to show how this qualified as a reproduction.  Such a conclu-
sion would, however, be difficult once again because of the absence of a
competitive relationship between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s work.
The unlikelihood of consumers switching from the plaintiff’s sound re-
cording to the defendant’s work on the basis of a two-second sample
would suggest that this is not within the same market as the original
and is therefore not infringement.  Of course, that does not mean all
cases of sampling are exempt from copyright.  If it can be shown that
the sample amounted to such a qualitative or quantitative amount
that a competitive relationship existed, then an infringement would
occur.
D. The Similarities Between the Two Approaches
The U.K.’s adoption of a rule-based approach therefore leads to dif-
ferent case outcomes in some instances of novel derivative works.
However, it does not lead to different results in every case.  Many sim-
ilarities still exist between the two regimes.  Four examples demon-
strate how often adaptations that infringe the U.S. derivative work
right often fall within the U.K. reproduction right.
200. See Case 19/84 Pharmon B.V. v. Hoechst AG, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 775, para. 22;
Case C-324/08 Marko CV. v. Diesel SpA., [2010] Bus LR 608, para. 19–57.
201. 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
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1. Remixes
In the past twenty years various forms of amateur adaptations
have formed on the Internet.  The literature on this phenomenon is
already quite well-developed.202  The term remix culture indeed con-
cerns various different types of adaptations.  For example, music
mash-ups203 (the synthesis of two individual songs into one whole new
song), anime music videos204 (the combination of music to scenes of
animated video), and fan fiction205 (the reworking of popular televi-
sion shows, films, and books into new short stories) are all part of this
culture.  Take, for example, a music mash-up.  Often these are created
when a user takes the vocal track from one sound recording and the
instrumental track from another and combines them.  While some of
these works will be protected under the U.S. fair use standard, many
still initially infringe the derivative works right.
202. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY (Penguin Press 2008); Lisa Veasman, Note, “Piggy Backing” on
Web 2.0 Internet: Copyright Liability and Web 2.0 Mashups, 30 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 311 (2008); Robert P. Merges, Locke Remixed ;-), 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1259 (2007); Michael Katz, Recycling Copyright: Survival & Growth in the
Remix Age, 13 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 21 (2008); Steven Hetcher, Using Social
Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869
(2009); Steven Hetcher, The Kids Are Alright: Applying a Fault Liability Stan-
dard to Amateur Digital Remix, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1275 (2010); Rebecca Tushnet,
Hybrid Vigour: Mashuos, Cyborgs, and Other Necessary Monsters, 6 I/S: J. L. &
POL. 1 (2010); Thomas W. Joo, Remix Without Romance, 44 CONN. L. REV. 415
(2011); Robert M. Vrana, Note, The Remix Artist’s Catch-22: A Proposal for Com-
pulsory Licensing for Transformative, Sampling-Based Music, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 811 (2011); Rebecca Tushnet, Scary Monsters: Hybrids, Mashups, and Other
Illegitimate Children, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2133 (2011) [hereinafter Tushnet,
Scary Monsters].
203. See, e.g., Emily Harper, Note, Music Mashups: Testing the Limits of Copyright
Law As Remix Culture Takes Society by Storm, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405 (2010).
204. See, e.g., Tushnet, Scary Monsters, supra note 202; Patrick McKay, Culture of the
Future: Adapting Copyright Law to Accommodate Fan-Made Derivative Works in
the Twenty First Century, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 117 (2011).
205. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Note, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a
New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997); Meredith McCardle,
Fan Fiction, Fandom, and Fanfare: What’s all the Fuss?, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
433 (2003); Leanne Stendell, Fanfic and Fan Fact: How Current Copyright Law
Ignores the Reality of Copyright Owner and Consumer Interests in Fan Fiction, 58
SMU L. REV. 1551 (2005); Mollie E. Nolan, Note, Search for Original Expression:
Fan Fiction and the Fair Use Defense, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 533 (2006); Sonia K.
Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461 (2006); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder,
Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (2007); Aaron Schwabach, The Harry Potter Lexicon and the
World of Fandom; Fan Fiction, Outsider Works, and Copyright, 70 U. PITT. L.
REV. 387 (2009); Rachel L. Stroude, Note, Complimentary Creation: Protecting
Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 191 (2010); Stacey M.
Lantagne, The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction: The Need for True and Logical
Precedent, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 159 (2011).
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Often these too will infringe U.K. copyright.  Although they do not
fall within the right to make adaptations, they often infringe the right
of reproduction.206  When the remix takes sufficient amount of the
original work’s expression, a competitive market relationship is quite
plausible.  In this case, the right of reproduction would apply.
2. Colorization of Motion Pictures
The colorization of old black-and-white movies is a technology that
developed in the mid ‘80s and which came to fruition as the U.K. re-
vised the copyright laws.  In the U.S., the Copyright Office has sig-
naled that it considers these colorizations as derivative works.207
These are also infringements of U.K. copyright.  However, this would
most likely occur under the right of reproduction.  The adaptation
right does not provide a right to colorize films.208  However, clearly
large quantitative and qualitative copying has occurred, and as a re-
sult, a competitive relationship exists sufficient to infringe the right of
reproduction.209
3. Motion Picture Characters in Video Games
The use of fictional characters in video games presents another de-
rivative work right infringement.210  Equally, this practice is likely to
infringe the right of reproduction in the U.K. Complete reproduction
of a character amounts to qualitative copying, much like taking the
soliloquy from Hamlet. This would lead to a competitive relationship,
as some would prefer to play the video game rather than spend the
money watching the motion picture.
4. Sequels and Prequels
In recent years, some industries (such as the film industry)211 have
begun to rely heavily on sequels and prequels as a major source of
206. See UK Government Response to European Commission’s Green Paper—Copy-
right in the Knowledge Economy (Dec. 2008), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/c-eupaper.pdf
(rejecting calls to create a user-generated content copyright exemption).
207. Copyright Registration for Colorized Versions of Black and White Motion Pic-
tures, 52 Fed. Reg. 23443 (proposed June 11, 1987) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
202).
208. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 21(3) (U.K.).
209. See Robyn Durie, Colourisation of Films, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 37 (1988);
Claudia Roggero, Colourisation and the Right to Preserve the Integrity of a Film:
A Comparative Study Between Civil and Common Law, 22 ENT. L. REV. 25 (2011).
210. Samuelson, supra note 11, at Table 2, “Matrix of What Are and Are Not Poten-
tially Infringing Derivative Works.”
211. See, e.g., CAROLYN JESS-COOKE, FILM SEQUELS: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM
HOLLYWOOD TO BOLLYWOOD (Edinburgh University Press 2009).
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revenue.212  These fall under the right to prepare derivative works in
U.S. copyright.213  In the U.K., often these do not fall under the adap-
tation right.  An audio–visual work does not receive any express abil-
ity to create sequels or prequels.  However, they are routinely licensed
because doing otherwise would infringe the right of reproduction.
These works copy significant expression (e.g. plots, characters,
themes) and potentially substitute for the original work.  For example,
a substantial number of people would prefer to buy a copy of Peter
Jackson’s movie, The Hobbit, rather than the Lord of the Rings trilogy
if the former was substantially cheaper than the latter.
III. RULES VERSUS STANDARDS AND THE DERIVATIVE
WORK RIGHT
The fact that the U.S. derivative works right is broader than the
U.K. adaptation right is not in itself normatively problematic.  Before
we draw any conclusions about which country has created better law,
we must first assess the two countries’ doctrines in the light of copy-
right’s utilitarian purposes.  This part demonstrates that the U.K.
rule-based approach is better at achieving copyright’s economic goals.
This part shall first provide an introduction to the economics of rules
and standards and then proceed to apply the insights from this litera-
ture to the issue of derivative works.  Doing so demonstrates that the
U.S. standard-based approach results in law that is substantively too
broad and procedurally too costly.
A. The Economics of Rules and Standards
The difference between rules and standards is one of precision.
Rules are highly precise legal commands, e.g., you must drive below
seventy mph.  Standards are more imprecise, e.g., you must not drive
“dangerously.”  Standards allow the court more discretion to deter-
mine what conduct is unlawful.  In the driving example, the court fol-
lowing the rule can only consult the defendant’s speed to determine
the legality of his action.  Under the standard, the court can take into
account various other factors, e.g., weather conditions, road surface,
and volume of traffic.
212. The Harry Potter franchise is a good example of this.  The final movie in the
series, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part II, is currently the fourth-
highest grossing film of all time. See Box Office Mojo, All Time Box Office World-
wide Grosses, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/world/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2013).  Meanwhile, Iron Man 3 lies in fifth place. See id.
213. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 9, at 318, 326 (stating that sequels are within
the right); Samuelson, supra note 11.
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This distinction in precision results in a number of different eco-
nomic consequences for the legal system.214  Depending on the nature
of the conduct that is regulated, sometimes standards will lead to the
most efficient regulation, and other times rules will.  In order to deter-
mine which type of legal promulgation will be more efficient, a legisla-
ture ought to consider two issues: what type of law will produce more
efficient substantive law and what type of law will be procedurally the
least costly to create and apply.
1. Substantive Efficiency
Firstly, the lawmaker must determine whether rules or standards
lead to more efficient substantive law outcomes.  Substantively effi-
cient legal outcomes require an absence of over- and under-inclusivity
in the law.  Over-inclusivity occurs when the law penalizes action that
is efficient.  Under-inclusivity occurs when the law permits inefficient
action.  Standards and rules both might lead to over- and under-
inclusion.215
To see how a rule might lead to over- and under-inclusion, imagine
a legislature promulgates a rule that all people ought to drive less
than seventy miles per hour.  In some cases, this will lead to over-
inclusion.  Sometimes it will be efficient to drive at ninety (perhaps it
is a straight, empty road on a clear day, and the driver must get to a
socially important engagement quickly), but driving at this speed will
result in liability.  On the other hand, the rule may also be under-
inclusive.  Sometimes driving at seventy will be dangerous (perhaps
the weather conditions are bad and traffic is heavy).  In such cases,
driving at seventy miles per hour inefficiently increases the risk of
accidents, yet the law does not penalize the conduct.216
On the other hand, a standard may also lead to over- and under-
inclusion.217  For example, currently extensive rules and regulations
are employed to regulate the disposal of hazardous materials.218  This
could be replaced with a standard that all people ought to dispose haz-
ardous material “safely.”  It seems highly probable that the law will
become over- and under-inclusive in this scenario.  Imagine that some-
one appears before the court accused of disposing the material in an
unsafe fashion.  In order to determine what is “safe” in this context,
the court would be required to conduct extensive research regarding
the properties of the material in question and the long-term effects the
214. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 16; Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision
of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
215. Diver, supra note 214, at 73; Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 16, at 268.
216. See Diver, supra note 214, at 73.
217. Id.
218. 40 C.F.R. §§ 260–282 (2012).
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material has on the environment and people around it.  The complex
nature of this task increases the possibility for judicial error.  As a
result, it is probable that the court will incorrectly determine what is
safe in the case before it.  The consequence is that some efficient ac-
tion will be penalized and some inefficient action will be permitted.  In
cases such as this (and other complex issues such as the tax code),
courts are not institutionally capable of determining what action is
efficient.  The legislature, which has greater fact-finding and social-
planning powers, investigates the matter and sets detailed, precise,
and efficient rules for courts to apply.
2. Procedural Efficiency
The first issue to consider is whether rules or standards will reduce
the potential for inefficient over- and under-inclusivity in the law.  But
this is not the only factor in the analysis.  The legislature must also
take into account the costs of creating and applying the law.  Some-
times optimally structured substantive law may prove too costly for
society.  For example, the optimal regulation may involve highly com-
plex rules, but this may cost the legislature too much to design.  In
which case, a vaguer, easier-to-design standard may be the cheapest
option overall.  On the other hand, adopting a broad standard might
be optimal, but applying this standard may take up so much of the
judiciary’s resources that rules are in fact preferable.  These cases in-
volve making a tradeoff between the benefits of optimal substantive
law and the procedural costs of using that law.  Assessing the procedu-
ral cost requires one to estimate the cost of creating the law and the
cost of applying it thereafter.219
Rules are usually more expensive to create than standards.220  To
enact law, the legislature must first determine what actions are effi-
cient.  Doing so requires the legislature to undertake independent re-
search, as well as consult with lawyers, economists, and those affected
by the law.  As the legislature seeks to make its law more precise,
more time and effort must be spent in determining precisely what is
efficient action.  Rules therefore require more fact-finding than
standards.
Rules also require more legislative resources to draft.221  Because
the statutory wording is determinative of case outcomes, the wording
must be clear to avoid misinterpretations.  Greater precision requires
more time and effort ensuring the language chosen is correct.  Greater
precision also requires more negotiating time.  Vague standards are
often rather unobjectionable. More precise rules draw criticism.  For
219. Diver, supra note 214, at 73–74.
220. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 16, at 267.
221. Id.
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example, if the rule that people ought to drive under seventy miles per
hour is suggested, some will argue this is too fast, and others will say
it is too slow.  But such disagreements are usually avoided if the law is
drafted generally, for example, if the law states that people must re-
frain from driving “dangerously.”
Thereafter, one must then consider the costs of applying the law.
On this factor, rules are preferable to standards.  As rules are more
precise, judges need spend less time deliberating on how they ought to
be applied.  This is also true for other people who must apply the law,
such as police officers, administrative officials, and citizens who must
interpret the law to determine whether their conduct is lawful.  The
vagueness inherent in standards makes the application procedure
slower and more costly.222
The costs of creating and applying the laws pull in opposite direc-
tions.  Rules are expensive to create but cheap to apply, while stan-
dards are cheap to create but costly to apply.  Discovering which is
cheapest is ultimately a complex empirical question.  However, an-
swering this question is also possible theoretically.  In determining
whether the combined cost of creating and applying the law is greater
in rules or in standards, one must determine how frequently the law is
applied.  If the law is applied very frequently, then using rules is pref-
erable.  If the law is applied infrequently, then using standards is
preferable.223
Rules are cheaper to apply than standards.  Therefore, every time
a rule is applied, a small savings is made (because the alternative
would be to apply a more expensive standard).  As the law is applied
more often, the number of these little savings increases and accumu-
lates.  At some point, the savings that using rules provides in the ap-
plication stage is going to be greater than the initial costs the
legislature faces to create the law.  Although the law initially requires
high legislative costs to create, this cost will be outweighed by the ben-
efits brought about by simple and quick application of the rule.  On
the other hand, this will not occur if the conduct is infrequent.  If the
conduct is infrequent, and the rules are not applied often, then the
savings stemming from clearer rules will not be realized.  In such
cases, the high legislative costs will not be offset and the use of stan-
dards is preferable.
B. Rules and Standards in the Derivative Work Right
We must now apply the insights from the economic literature on
rules and standards to the differing approaches to derivative works.
222. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 16, at 265; see Diver, supra note 214, at 73–74.
223. Kaplow, supra note 214, at 563.
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1. Substantive Efficiency
The U.S. law has become wildly over-inclusive in relation to its eco-
nomic purpose.  The U.K., by contrast has avoided this problem.  To
demonstrate this, we shall first define over- and under-inclusivity in
this area, then demonstrate how the U.S. is more over-inclusive than
the U.K., and finally demonstrate that the U.K.’s rule-based approach
has not become correspondingly under-inclusive.
a. Defining Over- and Under-Inclusivity
This paper has already demonstrated how the U.S. and U.K. have
struggled with over- and under-inclusivity at various points.  For the
purposes of this section, we need to define over- and under-inclusivity
in more exact detail.  In order to do this, we must more clearly relate
the concepts of over- and under-inclusivity to copyright’s economic
goals.
Copyright is a tool for incentivizing authors to create new works.
Works have a positive impact on the welfare of society, yet without
copyright protection, it is arguable that the number of works created
would decrease to a sub-optimal level.  In order to create a copyrighted
work, the author must spend a large amount of resources on fixed
costs.  If he cannot recover those fixed costs, he will not create the
work.  Copyright provides the author with market exclusivity, so that
he can charge a price above the work’s marginal cost, thus recovering
the lost investment.224
On the other hand, copyright is not costless.  Copyright produces
static inefficiency.  Some consumers will demand the work and also be
willing to pay a price above marginal cost but will not be able to afford
the work at the supra-competitive price.  Welfare decreases as this de-
mand goes unfulfilled.  This is even more worrisome when one consid-
ers that these potential consumers may also be future creators.  If
someone wishes to transform or build on the previous work in order to
create a new work, they must pay a license fee to the original owner.
As the copyright becomes stronger, the first author’s ability to set
prices increases.  But as the price of the license becomes higher, the
ability of the second, later creator to pay for the work decreases.  In-
creasing the scope of copyright right too broadly may increase the in-
centive to produce the original work, but it may short change future
generations as the costs of creating subsequent works increase too far.
And finally, there are enforcement costs to imposing this new regime.
224. See, e.g., Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of
Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,
84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
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This is the now infamous incentive-access paradigm of copy-
right.225  Greater rights for authors increase the incentive to produce
new works but also generate economic costs.  Copyright policy is
therefore an attempt to balance these competing concerns.  The bal-
ance is accomplished by narrowly tailoring the author’s exclusive
rights.  Society provides the author with just enough market power to
incentivize creation, but no further.  In order to recover his fixed cost
of investment, the author needs the ability to price the work above
marginal cost.  But once that criterion has been met, there is no need
to increase the author’s market power further.  The ability to price the
work far higher than marginal cost incurs the costs of copyright with-
out any resulting benefit.  Ideal copyright would therefore allow an
author to charge a price just above marginal cost and no further.
Using this underlying goal of copyright, we can now more exactly
define when copyright is over-inclusive or under-inclusive.  Over-in-
clusion occurs when copyright allows the author to exclude works from
the market that do not pose any feasible threat to his ability to price
above marginal cost.  Under-inclusion occurs when the copyright
holder cannot exclude from the marketplace works that undercut his
ability to price his work just above marginal cost.
b. Over-Inclusivity
The U.S. law gives the author exclusivity over works that pose no
credible threat to his underlying incentives.  The forgoing discussion
in Part II.C provides a wealth of examples of such excessive breadth.
Consider the issue of mounting presented by the Mirage Editions
case.226  The court found that a derivative work was created when the
defendant affixed a legitimately acquired work to a ceramic tile and
resold it to the public.  Notably, however, for every tile he created, the
defendant had to buy a unit of the copyrighted work.  Therefore, for
every unit that the defendant sold, the original copyright holder was
compensated at the price the right holder set.  The defendant’s subse-
quent actions, therefore, presented no threat to the author’s ability to
price supra-competitively.
Other examples of this point can be found in the Castle Rock227
and Bridgeport228 cases.  These cases concerned the issue of the
Seinfeld trivia quiz book and the minimal sampling of sound record-
ings.  In neither case is it likely that the copying in question would
lead consumers to prefer the adaptation to the original. Seinfeld fans
will not refuse to buy Seinfeld because they can read five percent of
the work in a trivia quiz book.  Similarly, consumers are unlikely to
225. Lunney, supra note 7 (discussing the incentive-access paradigm).
226. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
227. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
228. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.  Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
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purchase one sound recording rather than another, merely on the
grounds that the former recording contains an unlicensed two-second
sample appropriated from the latter.  The fact that they are not sub-
stitutes makes market harm highly unlikely.
Furthermore, other examples demonstrate not only the absence of
market harm but in fact suggest the derivative works right encom-
passes certain activities that are actually beneficial to the original
copyright holder’s profit.  Take the video game cartridge in Midway229
or the cassette tapes in Worlds of Wonder.230  In order for the cus-
tomer to get any utility from these products, he must first buy the
plaintiff’s product.  That is, in order to use the video game cartridge in
Midway, the consumer must first buy the plaintiff’s original video
game.  And to use the cassette tapes in Worlds of Wonder, the con-
sumer must also buy the plaintiff’s original Teddy Ruxpin bear.  These
are examples of complementary works, as opposed to substitutes.
Their availability in the market does not harm demand for the origi-
nal good but actually increases it.  For example, some people would be
likely to buy the Teddy Ruxpin bear, given that they could also buy
additional cassette tapes elsewhere.  Therefore the demand for the
original work increases.  Two noted scholars have already said that
these complementary works should be outside the scope of the deriva-
tive works right.231
In all of these instances, the U.S. derivative works right is over-
inclusive.  Congress introduced the derivative work right to produce
flexibility, but this has subsequently proved problematic for the judici-
ary.  The lack of natural boundaries on the concept of derivative works
has resulted in the courts finding infringement in almost any case
where a second comer builds upon a copyrighted work.  By contrast,
the U.K. has avoided this over-inclusion.  These novel adaptation
types do not fall within the right to make adaptations, nor do they
infringe the right of reproduction because they do not create an incen-
tive-harming competitive relationship with the author’s work.
What is more, these cases would also probably not infringe the U.S.
right of reproduction.  Because they do not reproduce expression lead-
ing to a competitive relationship, it is unlikely that they would be con-
sidered substantially similar for the purposes of the reproduction
right.  The over-inclusivity found in U.S. law, therefore, directly stems
from the broad, expansive, derivative work right.
229. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l., Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
230. See cases cited supra note 6.
231. See sources cited supra note 8.
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c. Under-Inclusivity
The U.K. approach is better at reducing excessive over-inclusion
regarding derivative works.  One may then wonder whether it has
caused an alternative problem, i.e. under-inclusivity.  That was the
experience of the U.S. under the 1909 Act: the law was written in a
rigid fashion and thus was unable to deal with emerging technologies.
However, the U.K. has avoided this problem by combining a rules-
based approach to the right to make adaptations with flexibility in the
right to make reproductions.  When an adaptation does threaten the
author’s ability to price supra-competitively, this will routinely in-
fringe the right of reproduction.  That is the experience born from
remix culture, colorization of motion pictures, using characters from
motion pictures in video games, sequels, and prequels.232  In any of
these cases, a possibility exists that the adaptation will harm the au-
thor’s incentives.  Accordingly, they are in a competitive relationship
with the author’s work and infringe the right of reproduction.
The U.K. doctrine therefore reveals that the rules-based approach
to derivative works, when combined with some flexibility in the right
of reproduction, is no less under-inclusive than the approach favored
in the U.S.  This, as demonstrated in Part I, was precisely the inten-
tion of the U.K. Parliament.  It seems the U.K.’s attempt to secure a
clear adaptation right, while retaining flexibility to deal with new
technology through the right of reproduction, was the preferable route
to producing efficient substantive law regarding derivative works.
The problem for the U.S. 1909 Act was not that its provision on deriva-
tive works was rule-based and inflexible.  The problem was that the
derivative work provision was rule-based, and there was no back-up
flexibility elsewhere.
2. Procedural Efficiency
That the U.K. rule-based approach has produced substantively bet-
ter law is, however, only the first step in our analysis.  We must con-
sider the global effects the decision to employ rules has on the
copyright system.  This requires consideration of whether rules or
standards are cheaper to create and apply.
There is a strong case that regulating derivative works with rules
is cheaper than using a standard.  One can expect that the U.K. rule-
based approach will cost more for the legislature to create but will cost
less for the judiciary, administrative officials, and citizens to apply.
One can equally expect the opposite to be true of the U.S. standard-
based approach.  This will cost little to create but more to apply.
Therefore, the crucial question is how frequently will the laws on de-
rivative works be applied?
232. See supra Part II.D.
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The answer to this is quite clear.  The laws on derivative works
will be applied very frequently.  This Article has covered the history of
the derivative work right throughout Anglo-American copyright.
From this overview, one can glean how derivative works have caused
courts problems from the very birth of copyright all the way to today.
This concept is so problematic for the legal regime because no artist
creates in a vacuum.  All artistic creation is in some way derivative.
Every author takes inspiration from authors of the past and, as a re-
sult, stands on the shoulders of giants.  That all artists necessarily
build on the works preceding them suggests that the laws governing
derivative works will be applied with great frequency.  Therefore,
given the high amount of application, it is beneficial for the legislature
to engage in detailed ex ante rule making.  Therefore, not only is the
U.K. approach substantively more efficient, it is also procedurally
more efficient to create and apply.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Given that the U.S. approach has resulted in inefficient law, what
potential solutions are available?  Three possibilities are discussed
here: expansion of fair use, creating guidelines for courts on how to
interpret the derivative work right, and finally a adopting a rule-
based approach via a statutory amendment.  All three have their mer-
its, but this Article ultimately favors the statutory amendment
approach.
A. Expansion of Fair Use
One potential is to keep the derivative work right unaltered and
use of the fair-use doctrine to limit any over-inclusion.  Fair use does
in many cases already operate this way.233  In certain instances, the
doctrine does provide a flexible tool, capable of sorting harmful deriva-
tive works from publicly desirable derivative works.  Take, for exam-
ple, the Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.234  The case concerned
a work called The Wind Done Gone, by Alice Randall.  This novel
retold Margaret Mitchell’s popular novel, Gone With the Wind, from
the perspective of the black slaves.  Mitchell claimed copyright in-
fringement, and Randall claimed fair use.  The court agreed with Ran-
dall that this was a fair use.  The work provided a criticism of slavery
that made the work sufficiently transformative to avoid infringement.
Economic efficiency was well served by this decision.  These works
were highly different in their purpose and character.  It was therefore
unlikely that consumers of Mitchell’s work would instead buy Ran-
dall’s work.  Allowing Mitchell to control The Wind Done Gone would
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
234. 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001).
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have given her an excessively broad right, capable of excluding from
the market a potentially welfare-enhancing work that posed little
threat to her ability to price supra-competitively.
Sadly, fair use does not operate this way in all instances.  Fair use
provided no defense in the cases discussed in Part II.C.  Various fac-
tors may have contributed to this.  Some have claimed fair use is too
unpredictable,235 and others have claimed that fair use is too expen-
sive to litigate.236  Further still, some point to defects in the language
of fair use itself.  The statute says that a work will more likely be fair
use if it does not harm the “potential market” for the original work.  If
the court construes “potential market” to include licensing markets,
then various forms of derivative works will not count as fair use.237
All of the derivative works discussed in Part II.C could be licensed
and, therefore, could all harm a licensing market if they were freely
produced.
Nevertheless, fair use may be expanded to prevent such over-in-
clusivity.  Mark Lemley provides one such suggestion, in which fair
use is altered so that people who radically alter the original work will
benefit from its protection.238  Indeed, the courts’ growing reliance on
the transformative use doctrine does provide more and more protec-
tion for the creators of derivative works.239
However, this Article expresses some reservation about relying on
fair use as the sole limit on the derivative work right’s over-inclusion.
Not only has it failed to prevent over-inclusivity in the past, but it is
also a standard-based approach to the issue.  Fair use is vague and
imprecise.  It is therefore difficult and costly to apply.  As the previous
section determined, relying on such standards is inefficient where the
law is applied very frequently.  While expanding fair use may limit the
over-inclusion in the existing law, its standard nature would make it
more costly to apply than enacting narrowly tailored rules that legis-
latively determine the scope of the right.
235. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (Penguin
Press 2004) (fair use’s unpredictability makes it into merely “the right to hire a
lawyer”).   However, others have different views on the predictability of fair use.
See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009);
Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012).
236. Some have suggested shifting attorneys’ fees in fair-use litigation. See Peter
Menell & Ben Depoorter, Copyright Fee Shifting: A Proposal to Promote Fair Use
and Fair Licensing, CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
237. However, this view is often critiqued. See, e.g., Matthew Africa, The Misuse of
Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and
the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145 (2000).
238. Lemley, supra note 14, at 1077–83.
239. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 715 (2011).
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B. Derivative Work Guidelines
There is nothing inherent within the current U.S. derivative work
right that compels courts to apply the law so broadly.  Although Con-
gress wanted broad statutory language, it did so because that would
lead to flexibility.  Because the derivative work right is an imprecise
standard, courts do have some ability to shape their interpretation of
the derivative work right in the future.  It is possible that guidelines
could be developed to show courts how to resolve derivative works
cases in a more restricted, economically efficient way.
Professor Samuelson notes that the derivative work provision is
not completely open-ended.240  The definition of derivative work in-
cludes nine enumerated examples (“translations, musical arrange-
ment, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation”) before going
on to say that the right also includes any other form of adaptation.
Congress must have inserted these examples for a reason.  Professor
Samuelson therefore makes the case that the only types of derivative
works that ought to fall within the “any other form” language are
those that are analogous to the current nine examples.
Samuelson’s approach would provide a substantial step forward.
Focusing on the nine examples would make the derivative work right
more precise and rule-based than it currently is.  As a result, it would
cut down the current over-inclusivity and better serve the utilitarian
purpose at the heart of copyright.  And given the extensive time enact-
ing copyright legislation often takes, this would be an appropriate so-
lution in the short term, before Congress has the opportunity to enact
a new statute.
C. Statutory Amendment
However, in the long run, a statutory amendment adopting a rule-
based approach is still preferable.  Although a sounder interpretation
of the existing law is desirable, there is little guarantee that courts
will maintain this sound interpretation over a long duration of time.
The experience demonstrated by the U.K. gramophone case, and the
U.S. derivative work right post-1976, is that, frequently, general
wording can be misinterpreted.  Even if well-drafted guidelines are
put in place today, there is a serious risk they will be forgotten in the
future when the judiciary’s mind is concerned with new technologies.
On the other hand, incorporating rules into the statute provides a se-
rious barrier to over-inclusive law in the future.
The exact wording of the right is still a matter for Congress to de-
cide.  Enacting rule-based law does not mean the U.S. must adopt ex-
240. Samuelson, supra note 11.
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actly the same rules as the U.K.  The superior fact-finding powers of
Congress should be used to empirically test which types of derivative
works are likely to harm a copyright holder’s incentives.  Those which
do harm an author’s ability to price supra-competitively ought to be
listed as potentially infringing derivative works.  Given the current
interest in copyright reform, and the potential for new legislation, now
is the appropriate time for Congress to undertake that task.
Until empirical research can be undertaken to determine what
types of derivative works cause harm to an author’s incentives, Con-
gress ought to transform its current law from a standard-based ap-
proach to a precise, rule-based approach.  To do this, the “any other
form” language must be removed.  Additionally, the list of derivative
work examples ought to become an exhaustive, not merely illustrative,
list.  As a result, the definition of a derivative work would be: “a trans-
lation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, or
condensation.”  When novel derivative works potentially threaten the
author’s market, courts should ask whether the new work copies so
much expression that it potentially serves as an economic substitute
for the plaintiff’s work and, therefore, whether it infringes the existing
right of reproduction.
V. CONCLUSIONS
After the Copyright Act 1976 came into force, it only took a few
years before scholars began to raise doubts about the derivative work
right.  Ralph Brown presciently analogized the law to the falcon’s gyre
in Yeats’s poem, The Second Coming.241  The poem describes a falcon
flying around a falconer.  Ideally, the falcon revolves around the fal-
coner in a contained circular motion, never losing sight of its master.
However, as the poem’s falcon gets higher, it can no longer hear the
falconer’s calls.  The bird’s flight path widens and widens.  Eventually
when the falcon gets too high, the relationship between falcon and fal-
coner breaks down completely, and the falcon becomes totally uncon-
trolled.  Today the U.S. derivative work right is just as uncontrolled as
the falcon.  The decision to use broad, open-ended language resulted in
a derivative work concept without any constraints.  The lack of an up-
per limit on the concept has allowed courts to find infringement al-
most any time the author’s work is reused (as demonstrated by
egregious cases like Midway and Mirage).  The fair-use doctrine does
provide a limit on this right, but one does not need to look hard to find
cases where fair use has not adequately performed that role.  As a re-
241. Brown, supra note 7, at 1.
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sult, Brown’s worries live on as numerous scholars suggest ways to
reform the law.242
Precise, rule-based copyright also has clear problems.  The 1909
Act could not keep pace with new technology.  However, the U.S. reac-
tion to the under-inclusivity of this law was excessive.  Clearly some
flexibility needed to be introduced, but the response of removing all
precision and limits from the derivative work rights was too extreme.
The U.K. approach was more measured. Rather than abandon all pre-
cision, the U.K. kept the adaptation right narrow.  The legislation
puts clear limits on what could qualify as an infringing adaptation.  To
continue Brown’s metaphor, the falcon’s wings were clipped by the
U.K.  An upper limit was created to prevent the falcon’s gyre from be-
coming too wide-reaching and uncontrolled.  As a result, the law has
not become excessively broad and costly, like U.S. law has.  Whereas
anxiety pervades discussion surrounding the ever-expanding U.S. de-
rivative work right, there is remarkably little concern in the U.K.
about the adaptation right.  The U.S. would therefore be well-advised
to adopt a rule-based approach to the derivative work right in any fu-
ture copyright revision.
242. Lemley, supra note 14.
